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A Bibi plea bargain may end the political deadlock

Go-betweens have been testing the waters for a potential way to bring an end to the former PM's trial and allow a broader coalition that both Likud and at least one of the centrist parties can be part of

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Leader of the Opposition and head of the Likud party Benjamin Netanyahu speaks to the media in Tel Aviv on October 3, 2022. Photo by Avshalom Sassoni/Flash90 *** Local Caption *** יו"ר הליכוד מצודת זאב מסיבת עיתונאים בנימין נתניהו מדבר

Asked three months ago to list the security crises likeliest to derail the election campaign, one of Israel’s security chiefs reeled off the obvious scenarios: an escalation in Gaza, a wave of terror attacks originating from the West Bank and the signing of a disadvantageous (at least from Israel’s perspective) nuclear agreement with Iran.

But top of his list was the potential of an armed confrontation with Hezbollah blowing up as a result of the dispute between Israel and Lebanon over the border between the two countries’ territorial waters.

The escalation with Gaza came in early August, but ended quickly with Israel decimating Islamic Jihad and Hamas staying on the sidelines. Violence is on the rise in the West Bank, but for now at least Israel’s security forces have contained it there, with only a tiny handful of attackers making it to the Green Line. And despite predictions that a deal with Iran was on the brink of being signed, talks seem to have broken down.

Hezbollah appears to have been mollified by an agreement brokered by the Biden administration between Israel and Lebanon. The agreement has yet to be fully published but it seems to include the Lebanese accepting that Israel can start operating its Karish gas field within weeks, as well as an Israeli concession that Lebanon will be allowed a new gas field in waters that Israel considers its own (in return for a share of the income when it comes online).

A war with Hezbollah has been averted but the agreement achieved on the eve of an election could still be explosive. It can be seen as a logical and fair compromise that gives Israel immediate access to the gas field without threats of missile attacks — and creates a shared interest with Lebanon in keeping the peace in the future. Which is, of course, how Prime Minister Yair Lapid wants Israelis to see the agreement — and to see him as an efficient and competent leader who finally resolved a long-standing source of tension.

But it can also be seen as a shocking surrender by Israel to Hezbollah bullying, leaving a potentially lucrative energy resource in enemy hands — as well as being a legally questionable decision of an interim government.

That is how the leader of the opposition Benjamin Netanyahu wants it to be seen, and for Mr Lapid to be seen as a weak pushover who needs to be replaced as soon as possible. By him.

How one sees the agreement depends mainly on where one stands politically. It’s a test for both contenders’ presentational powers and persuasiveness (if any wavering voters still remain).

What is interesting is that the Biden administration had the time and energy to engage in the complex diplomacy leading to the agreement, when it is dealing with a much more urgent security and energy crisis in Ukraine.

A key figure in the American efforts is the State Department’s Senior Advisor for Energy Security, Amos Hochstein, whose focus on this issue could just be connected to the fact that he is also an Israeli citizen, born and raised in Jerusalem, who returned to his parents’ homeland only after serving in the IDF. Further proof that if the US has a special relationship with any country, it’s with Israel.

Mr Hochstein is from a wealthy American-Israeli family with long-standing connections in the political establishments in both Jerusalem and Washington, but with a clear affinity with the left side of the aisle.

It remains to be seen whether the deal he brokered ends up helping or hindering the Biden’s administration’s preferred candidate.

US meddling
Another feature of the special American-Israeli relationship is the preponderance of senior US politicians visiting Jerusalem. Last month it was a delegation of senators led by Robert Menendez, chair of the Senate’s foreign relations committee.

According to a report this week by diplomatic correspondent Barak Ravid, in their meeting with Mr Netanyahu, Senator Menendez voiced “serious concerns” over the prospect of his forming a government after the election with “extremist and polarising individuals like [Itamar] Ben-Gvir”.

Participants in the meeting described Mr Netanyahu as being visibly annoyed at what he saw as an improper intervention in Israel’s internal politics (though it would be a case of glass houses for him to protest).

But he was even angrier when the exchange leaked, especially as it was the second embarrassing leak for him from that meeting with Senator Menendez. The previous report was about how a Likud camera crew had tried to film the meeting, probably for use in the campaign (glass houses again).

The Netanyahu team are convinced that in both cases the leaker was US Ambassador Tom Nides. Mr Nides spent the last year trying to push through a complex agreement that would allow Israelis visa-free travel to the US.

And just as he was on the brink of success, the government fell. The necessary regulations could still have been voted upon by the Knesset before its dissolution but Mr Netanyahu refused to hold the vote before the election for fear that the Lapid government would get the credit for such a popular breakthrough. Now Ambassador Nides, according to Mr Netanyahu’s circle, is out to get him.

Rotation deal
Whether or not Mr Netanyahu’s camp emerges from the election with a majority, any government that is formed will have the narrowest of majorities and find it extremely difficult to run the country as long as half the Knesset insists on having him as prime minister and the other half refuses to serve in a government led by a man facing criminal charges.

There seems no way to break this deadlock, which has consigned Israel to a series of never-ending stalemated election campaigns — unless there is a way to end the Netanyahu trial in a way that at least some of the parties currently opposed to the former prime minister can live with.

It’s hard to avoid the impression that the trial is descending into farce. This week, owners of liquor and cigar stores took the stand to testify to the value of gifts the defendant allegedly received.

Most of the delays are the results of the defence’s tactics but it is an expensive strategy, costing Mr Netanyahu both in legal bills and in his ability to manoeuvre politically. He would dearly like to end it. But short of winning a majority and forming a government that will allow him to gut the State Prosecutor’s Office, is there any other way out?

Discreetly, go-betweens have been testing the waters for a potential plea bargain — one that will both bring an end to the trial and allow a broader coalition that both Likud and at least one of the centrist parties can be part of. And it would not include the far-right.

Such a deal would have Mr Netanyahu admit to some of the charges in return for a limited sentence that would allow him to return to office, perhaps after two years, as part of a rotation deal in which, say, Benny Gantz would serve as prime minister for the first half.

It certainly isn’t anything that any of the party leaders will mention before the election. But once the votes are counted and further political paralysis beckons, it may suddenly make a lot of sense.

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