Gadi Eisenkot: The general who became Netanyahu’s principal challenger

Gadi Eisenkot is the latest in a long line of Israeli military chiefs who have attempted to convert national-security credentials into political leadership. Yet his rapid rise ahead of the election on October 27 has surprised even experienced observers.

Having entered parliamentary politics only four years ago, Eisenkot has overtaken more established opposition figures and emerged as Benjamin Netanyahu’s principal electoral challenger.

The movement of senior generals into politics is deeply embedded in Israeli history. Former chiefs of staff Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak became prime ministers, while Moshe Dayan, Shaul Mofaz, Moshe Ya’alon and Benny Gantz served as defence ministers.

Around two-thirds of former IDF chiefs of staff have entered national politics, reflecting the importance Israeli voters traditionally attach to military experience and national security, especially on the centre-left.

Born in Tiberias in 1960 to Moroccan Jewish parents and raised in Eilat, Eisenkot did not emerge from Israel’s traditional political or military elite. He joined the Golani Brigade in 1978 and gradually rose through the ranks, commanding the brigade and later serving as military secretary to Prime Minister Ehud Barak, head of the Judea and Samaria Division, head of the Operations Directorate, commander of the Northern Command and deputy chief of staff.

Eisenkot became the IDF’s 21st chief of staff in 2015, following his appointment by Netanyahu. During his four-year term, he strengthened the IDF’s ground forces and continued Israel’s campaign against Iranian entrenchment and weapons transfers in Syria.

He developed a reputation as a cautious, methodical commander who believed in the forceful use of military power, but was sceptical of operations without achievable political and strategic objectives.

This approach remains central to his political identity. Eisenkot is not a conventional peace-camp politician, nor does he present himself as one.

He has taken hawkish positions on Iran, Hezbollah and Israel’s freedom of military action, while dismissing immediate demands for Palestinian statehood as disconnected from current realities.

At the same time, he argues that military force must be connected to a coherent diplomatic strategy and that Israel cannot achieve lasting security through military operations alone.

Eisenkot entered politics before the 2022 election, joining Benny Gantz’s National Unity alliance.

After the Hamas-led massacre of October 7, 2023, he joined the emergency government and served as an observer in the war cabinet. His participation gave him direct knowledge of the government’s most sensitive decisions, but also associated him with the management of a war he would later criticise.

His political authority was strengthened by profound personal sacrifice. Eisenkot’s son, Gal, was killed fighting in Gaza in December 2023, and his nephew, Maor Cohen Eisenkot, was killed the following day. His loss has given particular weight to his insistence that political leaders must define realistic war objectives and take responsibility for their decisions.

Eisenkot left the government with Gantz in June 2024, arguing that Netanyahu had failed to establish a clear strategy for ending the war, returning the hostages and determining Gaza’s future.

In 2025, he separated from Gantz, resigned from the Knesset and established Yashar, building an independent political platform around responsibility, state institutions, universal service and national unity.

His initial rise was gradual. Naftali Bennett was widely expected to become the dominant opposition candidate, particularly after joining forces with Yair Lapid. However, Eisenkot has subsequently surpassed them. Polls show that his party is either the largest or equal to Likud in recent polls.

Eisenkot has therefore become, in electoral terms, the leading figure in the opposition to Netanyahu, but this does not guarantee that he can form a government. Israel’s elections are decided through coalitions, and the opposition remains divided over whether and how it could rely on Arab parties.

Nevertheless, Eisenkot now commands the momentum previously held by Bennett. His appeal rests partly on what he has not yet said. Eisenkot has deliberately avoided defining himself precisely as right-wing, centrist or centre-left. He has been clearer about governing principles than about many detailed policies, particularly on Palestinian issues, judicial reform, religion and state, and the composition of a future coalition.

This strategic ambiguity allows him to appeal simultaneously to several groups.

He needs disgruntled right-wing voters who no longer trust Netanyahu but remain conservative on security and territorial issues. He must also retain centrist voters attracted to his emphasis on responsibility and institutional stability, while remaining acceptable to centre-left Israelis whose priority is replacing Netanyahu.

The balancing act carries risks. Moving too far towards the centre-left could drive soft-right voters back to Likud or Bennett. Ruling out cooperation with Arab parties could make it mathematically impossible to form a government, but leaving the option open gives Netanyahu an effective campaign weapon.

The concern within Netanyahu’s camp is already visible. Likud advertisements have argued that Eisenkot cannot govern without Arab parties, using slogans such as “There is no Gadi without Tibi” – a reference to Ahmad Tibi, the leader of the Arab Ta'al party, and considered particularly unpopular amongst Jewish Israelis in the centre and on the right.

Another controversial AI-generated advertisement was criticised for appearing to invoke the death of Eisenkot’s son, although Likud denied that the figure shown was intended to represent him. The intensity and personal character of the campaign indicate that Netanyahu’s strategists increasingly regard Eisenkot, rather than Bennett or Lapid, as their most dangerous opponent.

Eisenkot’s challenge is now to transform personal credibility into a sufficiently clear political programme. His restraint and ambiguity have helped him rise, but a campaign for prime minister will eventually require difficult commitments. He must demonstrate not only that he represents an alternative to Netanyahu, but also what an Eisenkot government would actually do.

Ahead of the elections, Eisenkot is the strongest new force in Israeli politics. Whether he becomes the third former chief of staff to serve as prime minister will depend upon his ability to preserve a remarkably broad but potentially fragile coalition of voters.