Avigdor Liberman: Israel’s ultimate political outsider – too secular for the religious right, too hawkish for the centre-left

Avigdor Liberman has one of the most remarkable personal and political stories in Israel. He arrived as a young immigrant from Moldova, worked unloading luggage from aircraft at Ben-Gurion Airport and eventually became foreign minister, defence minister, finance minister and deputy prime minister. At the height of his influence, he was the second most powerful figure in the country.

Yet Liberman has never been fully embraced by sections of the Israeli public. He has served alongside Benjamin Netanyahu, helped build his political career and held senior office under him, but later became one of his most determined opponents.

Liberman is solidly part of the right on security issues but refuses to join a government dependent on the strictly Orthodox parties. This makes him difficult to place within Israel’s conventional blocs and potentially a decisive player after the upcoming election on October 27.

Liberman made Aliyah with his family in 1978, at the age of 20, speaking little Hebrew. He later served in the IDF, studied international relations and political science at the Hebrew University and became active in Likud-affiliated student politics.

His rise accelerated after he began working with Netanyahu in 1988. When Netanyahu became Likud leader, Liberman served as the party’s director-general and developed a reputation as a formidable organiser. Following Netanyahu’s election as prime minister in 1996, Liberman became director-general of the Prime Minister’s Office.

However, Liberman became disillusioned by Netanyahu’s seeming about face on the Oslo Process, which he originally opposed but once in office continued to implement. Netanyahu had campaigned on reversing or stopping the Oslo Accords, but then signed the Hebron Accords and the Wye River Memorandum with Yasser Arafat.

In 1999, he established Yisrael Beytenu, initially as a vehicle for the large Russian-speaking immigrant community whose concerns were often neglected by the established parties. He combined hard-line national-security positions with a strongly secular approach to religion and state.

This combination distinguished him from both Likud and the religious right. Liberman advocated forceful action against terrorism, Iran and Hamas, while also supporting civil marriage, public transport on Shabbat in non-religious communities, greater flexibility in conversion and the drafting of strictly Orthodox men into military or national service.

His party grew rapidly. Yisrael Beiteinu won four seats in 1999 but rose to 15 in 2009, making it Israel’s third-largest party. Liberman became foreign minister and deputy prime minister in Netanyahu’s government. For an immigrant who had carried suitcases at the airport three decades earlier, his arrival near the summit of Israeli power represented an extraordinary journey.

Liberman subsequently served as defence minister between 2016 and 2018. He resigned after Netanyahu accepted a ceasefire with Hamas, and the plan to allow cash from Qatar into Gaza, much of which ended up in Hamas’ hands, which Liberman described as capitulation to terrorism.

The resignation reinforced his reputation as one of Israel’s most hawkish politician, although critics argued that his uncompromising rhetoric did not always translate into different policies when he held responsibility.

The decisive break with Netanyahu came after the April 2019 election. Liberman refused to join a coalition that would not pass a Charedi military conscription law on terms he considered meaningful. Without Yisrael Beiteinu’s seats, Netanyahu could not form a majority, and Israel was forced into another election.

That decision fundamentally changed Israeli politics. Liberman transformed himself from Netanyahu’s most trusted former ally into a major obstacle to his continued rule. He also repositioned Yisrael Beiteinu from a primarily Russian-speaking immigrant party into a broader secular, liberal nationalist party.

This transition has been partially successful. Liberman continues to enjoy substantial support among Russian-speaking Israelis, but his electorate now includes secular native-born Israelis, traditional right-wing voters, reservists and people frustrated by the political influence of the strictly-Orthodox parties.

His party’s identity increasingly rests on the principle that citizens should contribute through military service, employment and taxation.

Liberman served as finance minister in the Bennett-Lapid government formed in 2021. His participation demonstrated his ability to work with parties from the centre and centre-left while remaining firmly right-wing on security. However, it also deepened the hostility between him and Netanyahu’s political camp.

Ahead of this election, Liberman has lost some of the momentum he enjoyed earlier in his career. The rise of Gadi Eisenkot and the partnership between Bennett and Lapid have crowded the opposition field. Yisrael Beiteinu is no longer approaching the 15 seats it won at its peak, while some voters who want a change of government are concentrating around larger parties.

Nevertheless, Liberman may be more important than his projected seat total suggests. His position between the blocs makes him a potential kingmaker.

He is arguably the most hawkish major figure in the opposition, particularly on Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, but he is also the most consistent long-term opponent of the strictly Orthodox parties and their demands on military service, education and public funding.

This creates problems for both sides. Liberman will not support another Netanyahu government dependent on Shas and United Torah Judaism. Yet he may also find it difficult to join a centre-left coalition reliant on Arab parties or committed to policies he considers insufficiently robust on security.

His central campaign themes are on the issues of universal military or national service, economic participation, reducing Charedi political influence and restoring deterrence against Israel’s enemies. These positions could make him essential to an Eisenkot or Bennett-led coalition, but also capable of blocking either if his conditions are not met.

Liberman remains Israel’s ultimate outsider: too secular for the religious right, too hawkish for much of the centre-left and too independent to submit easily to any political leader.

His momentum may have declined, but his leverage remains. In Israel’s fragmented system, the man who does not fit comfortably into either camp may ultimately decide which camp governs.