October 7 stress-tested our ties with Morocco but they survived – and the potential is now huge, say Israeli experts

In July 2023, Israel even formally recognised Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara, delivering a major diplomatic prize for Rabat. Then came October 7 and the Gaza war.

Large pro-Palestinian demonstrations were held in Moroccan cities, including protests explicitly demanding an end to normalisation, while direct tourism and aviation were severely disrupted.

Yet the underlying architecture of the relationship survived.

“The best word to describe this moment is ‘finally’,” Einat Levi, an expert on Israel-Morocco relations who was part of the founding team of Israel’s diplomatic mission in Morocco, told the JC.

The relationship, she said, had been tested by “an extraordinarily difficult period” but had nevertheless emerged with both governments deciding to move forward.

Crucially, however, different parts of the relationship reacted very differently to the war.

Levi said strategic ties and defence collaboration actually strengthened after October 2023, while political, economic and civil relations contracted. Tourism declined and businesses that continued working together largely moved their relationships out of public view.

Three years of intensive coverage of the war and social-media campaigns also damaged perceptions of Israel among Moroccans, she said, “particularly among the younger generation”.

Moroccan protesters waving Palestinian flags rally against Israel's approval of a death penalty bill, in Rabat on April 19, 2026. (Photo by Abdel Majid BZIOUAT / AFP via Getty Images)AFP via Getty Images

For Moroccan political analyst and civil society expert Aimane Cherragui, that is what makes the latest agreement significant.

“The September 2026 agreement is not important because Morocco and Israel suddenly decided to have relations,” he told the JC. “They already had extensive relations.

“It matters because they are now trying to institutionalise a relationship that survived October 7 politically, but was badly damaged socially.”

He describes the latest step as “the institutional completion of an unfinished cooperation”.

Trade continued through the war, while diplomatic channels remained open. In March 2024, those channels helped Morocco secure a route through Israel to deliver humanitarian assistance into Gaza, demonstrating how Rabat could maintain relations with Israel while continuing to engage on the Palestinian issue.

Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar said the latest agreement would now provide “practical ways” to deepen the relationship.

Regular direct flights would strengthen tourism and economic ties, he said, adding that Israel was “excited to welcome more Moroccans to the Holy Land”.

That ambition addresses one of the relationship’s persistent imbalances.

Before October 7, tens of thousands of Israelis visited Morocco annually, many drawn by family roots, Jewish pilgrimage sites, cemeteries, food and culture. Far fewer Moroccans travelled in the opposite direction.

Morocco has an unusual foundation on which to build such people-to-people ties. Its constitution recognises the “Hebraic” component of Moroccan identity, while the kingdom has invested extensively in preserving synagogues, Jewish cemeteries, mellahs and other parts of its Jewish heritage.

But Cherragui cautions against equating that history with contemporary attitudes towards Israel.

Moroccan Jewish heritage, attitudes towards Israelis and support for Israeli government policy or normalisation are separate questions, he said. For many Moroccans, support for relations remains closely connected to developments concerning the Palestinians.

“Remembering Moroccan Jews is not exactly the same thing as Moroccans and Israelis knowing one another today,” he said.

That leaves both governments with the challenge of transforming strong strategic relations into something broader.

Levi believes upgrading to full embassies could provide businesses, institutions and civil society with greater “confidence and legitimacy” to cooperate openly again.

The economic potential, she argues, remains largely untapped, particularly in technology, digital transformation, agriculture, water, renewable energy and tourism.

Sa’ar similarly identified innovation, health, water and agriculture as areas where permanent high-level diplomatic representation could accelerate cooperation.

For both Levi and Cherragui, however, the next stage cannot be confined to governments.

Levi argues that particular emphasis should be placed on younger Israelis and Moroccans, giving them opportunities to “create, study and work together” rather than simply encounter one another at diplomatic events.

Cherragui points to universities, entrepreneurs, artists, researchers, municipalities and civil society as potential vehicles for relationships that extend beyond official diplomacy, while insisting the Palestinian question cannot simply be left outside the room.

His assessment of the six years since normalisation is succinct: “2020 created the relationship. 2021-23 expanded it. October 7 stress-tested it. September 2026 is institutionalising what survived.”

And, he said, much survived: “Diplomacy survived. Security cooperation survived. Commercial relations survived. The American trilateral framework survived.”

Salma Annasse, a Moroccan geopolitical expert, said that what cannot be overlooked is the depth of history between not only Israel and Morocco but its Jewish heritage as a root between people.

“The relationship rests on ties older than the Abraham Accords. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis of Moroccan descent keep a living connection to the Kingdom, and for decades, even without official relations, thousands of them travelled to Morocco for religious holidays and pilgrimages.

“Morocco has nurtured that bond at home: its 2011 Constitution names the Hebraic heritage as part of national identity, and since 2020 Moroccan primary schools have taught Jewish history and culture, a first in the Arab world. The expanded direct flights, now set to include Moroccan airlines, will make these people-to-people ties easier to sustain,” she told the JC.

She also said that Morocco’s being part of the International Stabilisation Force in Gaza is recognition of Israel’s trust, Morocco among the first Muslim states to publicly commit personnel.

As time goes on, she says that Israel’s proposal to bring the European Union into joint projects with Morocco is worth watching. “The idea predates October 7 and came from Rabat and Brussels,” she said. On March 2, 2023, Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and EU Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi said in Rabat that they wanted to bring Israel into trilateral cooperation, and Bourita announced that a tripartite document was ready and would be signed before the end of that month.

“There is no evidence that it was ever signed, and no public Israeli statement on it from that period. For now, it remains a proposal,” she said, a sign that there is still huge opportunity for collaboration moving forward.