In 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made the historic decision to speak before the US Congress and lobby lawmakers against the nuclear deal – the JCPOA – that President Barack Obama was on the verge of finalising. It was monumental not only because it deepened an already widening rift between Israel and the Democratic Party, but because it marked the beginning of a broader strategic shift. Out of that confrontation would eventually emerge a new regional alignment that paved the way for the Abraham Accords.
When Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed normalisation agreements at the White House in September 2020, officials cited multiple motivations: stabilising the region, preventing annexation of the West Bank and expanding trade and technological cooperation. But Iran loomed large in the background. The accords were also about forming a united Israeli-Gulf front against a regime that was racing forward with its nuclear programme while exporting hegemony and terror across the Middle East.
Iran was an existential threat to Israel – the ayatollahs openly call for its destruction – but it was seen as no less dangerous by moderate Sunni states such as the UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. That is why, when reports surfaced two months later that Netanyahu and then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had secretly met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Neom, the futuristic city on the Red Sea, it felt like the next logical step.
Fast forward just a few years, and it was MBS himself who told Fox News in September 2023 that “every day we get closer” to normalisation with Israel. “We hope that will reach a place that it will ease the life of the Palestinians and get Israel as a player in the Middle East,” he said, signalling that a breakthrough was within reach.
Then came October 7.
In the immediate aftermath of Hamas’s massacre, there was still hope that once the war subsided, normalisation would return to the agenda. That has not happened. Instead, as the standoff with Iran drags on, the once-emerging united front has given way to a more fragmented Middle East. Israeli-Saudi normalisation appears distant, and unprecedented tensions have surfaced between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
Several factors appear to be at play, even if Saudi officials have not publicly articulated them. Jonathan Panikoff, a former US intelligence officer now at the Atlantic Council, recently argued that MBS has recalibrated his approach. “MBS originally embraced an adversarial foreign policy that focused on going after countries connected to political Islam,” Panikoff wrote in Foreign Affairs. “But he eventually realised such an approach was not advancing his paramount objective – achieving Vision 2030, which would see the kingdom wean itself off oil and become a hub for finance, business and travel.”
That shift has produced warmer Saudi ties with Turkey and Qatar – countries once viewed with deep suspicion in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. At the same time, relations with the UAE, whose ruler Mohammed bin Zayed was long seen as MBS’s mentor, have deteriorated sharply. Riyadh is pressuring multinational corporations to relocate regional headquarters from Dubai to Saudi Arabia or risk losing access to lucrative contracts. In Yemen, where the two countries once cooperated closely, Saudi forces bombed an Emirati arms shipment destined for a Yemeni separatist group in December.
Against this tense regional backdrop, Netanyahu travelled to Washington this week with a difficult mission: to persuade President Trump to define clear red lines for negotiations with Iran and to establish a firm timeline for how long those talks will be allowed to continue.
Israel’s concern is understandable. Only weeks ago, the Iranian regime appeared weakened – shaken by internal unrest and by Trump’s decision to deploy significant military assets to the region. Momentum seemed to be building against Tehran. Now, while the military presence remains, the centre of gravity has shifted back to diplomacy. The negotiating table, not the armada, is where the focus lies.
While what Trump will decide to do remains unclear, Senior Israeli officials privately acknowledged ahead of the Netanyahu trip the limits of their leverage. If Trump chooses to sign a deal, Netanyahu will not be able to simply order a strike. This is not 2015. This is not the JCPOA era. And Trump is not Obama.
But beyond airstrikes, centrifuges, enrichment levels and sunset clauses lies a larger issue that strikes at the region as a whole – will the region revert back to the old balance of power or will it know how to recreate the united front against Iran. No matter which way this goes, it is an issue of critical importance for Israel and the wider Middle East.
Yaakov Katz is a co-founder of the MEAD policy forum, a senior fellow at JPPI, and a former editor-in-chief of the Jerusalem Post. His newest book is While Israel Slept.
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