Egypt is revising its peace agreement with Israel

Since October 7, and Israel’s subsequent capture of the Philadelphi Corridor and the Gazan side of Rafah, Cairo contends these foundations have been shattered.

Cairo perceives the indefinite Israeli military presence in the Philadelphi Corridor, a buffer zone along its border, as a blatant violation of the treaty’s core promise: respect for sovereignty and inviolable borders as defined in Article II. This is not a minor dispute, it strikes at the heart of the territorial integrity the treaty was designed to guarantee.

On security, despite the severe erosion of trust, coordination continues for one critical reason: to prevent an unintended, catastrophic war. Cairo believes domestic Egyptian hostility towards Israel, fuelled by the war in Gaza, makes miscalculation dangerously likely. Therefore, it insists all mechanisms to prevent accidental conflict remain active, ensuring any future war would only stem from a deliberate governmental decision.

Regarding trade, Egypt maintains its stance that commercial deals must remain separate from geopolitical pressure. The landmark $35 billion gas deal, which would see Israeli gas exported to Egypt until 2040, is a prime example. Despite Israeli attempts to link its final approval to a reduction of Egyptian forces in Sinai, and despite rumours framing it as part of a broader geopolitical arrangement, Cairo has insisted the deal proceed on a strictly commercial basis.

Diplomatically, Egypt’s position has crystallised into a hardened principle: the first to recognise and last to normalise. This diplomatic chill is exemplified by President Sisi’s government withholding approval for Israel’s designated ambassador to Cairo, Ori Rotman, and by Egypt leaving its own ambassadorship in Tel Aviv vacant. Rotman was notably disinvited from a March 2025 presidential credentials ceremony, a public snub timed with the anniversary of the peace treaty itself (The Egypt-Israel peace treaty was signed on 26 March 1979).

Consequently, Egypt considers the pre-October 7 status quo obsolete. Based on my source’s information, Cairo is now shaping a new, de facto framework for relations, built on the following non-negotiable conditions:

A sustained military presence in Sinai: Egypt will not dismantle its increased military build-up in Sinai, which it sees as a necessary deterrent. This posture is specifically geared towards preventing any potential Israeli effort to forcibly displace Gazans into Egyptian territory, a possibility Egyptian officials have cited as a “declaration of war”. Cairo will demand Jerusalem accept this new security reality as a consequence of its own unilateral action in border areas.

Conditional and reduced diplomacy: A return to summit-level diplomacy, such as the Sisi-Netanyahu 2017 meeting, is now explicitly conditioned on a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and a credible commitment to Palestinian self-determination. As I had predicted in December, Cairo rejected President Trump’s invitation to Sisi to visit Mar-a-Lago and a proposed US-sponsored trilateral summit because these prerequisites were not met.

Compartmentalised cooperation: Security coordination and trade, like the gas deal, will continue but must be ringfenced from broader political negotiations. Cairo insists these collaborations cannot be used by Israel as levers to extract geopolitical concessions, such as accepting a resolution for Gaza that contradicts Egyptian interests.

Engagement only on Cairo’s terms: Egypt’s current doctrine mandates that strategic engagement occurs exclusively on its own terms. This is evidenced by the stark contrast between President Sisi’s repeated refusals to visit the White House and his decision to roll out the red carpet for President Trump at the Sharm El-Sheikh summit in October 2025, a venue that allowed Cairo to shape the agenda with regional partners and, crucially, in Israel’s absence.

Fundamentally, Egypt has begun to weaponise the Camp David Accords for strategic leverage. It calculates that the Trump administration, deeply invested in his personal legacy as a peacemaker, cannot afford the political rupture that would follow a suspension of the cornerstone Arab-Israeli peace treaty. By masterfully exploiting this vulnerability, Cairo has made its demands in Gaza a central, inescapable concern for Washington, thereby amplifying its influence over both the United States and Israel.

This strategic repositioning is not theoretical. It is evidenced by Egypt’s calculated and largely unprecedented diplomatic defiance, including President Sisi’s refusal to visit the White House, making him the only leader of a major Arab country yet to visit the US.

As my source concluded, following the Israeli recognition of Somaliland, another Egyptian red line violated by Israel, a return to the pre-October 7 status quo – often termed a “cold peace” – is virtually impossible. The foundations of Camp David have not been demolished, but they are being fundamentally, and perhaps permanently, reshaped by the aftermath of war.

Khaled Hassan is an Egyptian-British Council Member with the Israeli President’s Voice of the People Initiative and a geopolitical analyst. He specialises in Middle Eastern security, with over 14 years’ experience examining regional power strategies, alliance dynamics, and Arab-Israeli security doctrines. His analysis focuses on diplomacy, defence, religion, and conflict resolution.