The Mazsihisz noted a preponderance of antisemitic incidents “related to the one-sided presentation of certain historical events of concern to Jewry” and the rehabilitation of “openly antisemitic, far-right historical figures”.
The percentage of Hungarians who agree with statements such as “during the war, non-Jewish Hungarians suffered as much as Jews” or “the number of Jewish victims was much less than is generally claimed” has increased since 2006.
The most frequent perpetrator of antisemitism in public life was the Our Homeland Movement—a far-right splinter party that broke off from the Jobbik party in 2019 following its turn towards the mainstream right.
Yet it is also clear from the Mazsihisz’s report that the Hungarian state plays a critical role in shaping public attitudes towards Jews.
Following a concerted propaganda campaign against Mr Soros led by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, by 2018, 61 per cent of Hungarians believed he was “mainly a power-hungry, selfish businessman who strives to promote his own interests on a global scale” as opposed to a “generous billionaire supporting good causes who spends huge sums on important social problems” (31 per cent).
Those who watch state media channels as opposed to private or support Mr Orbán’s Fidesz party over opposition factions were far more likely to view Mr Soros in a negative light.
Hungary is home to around 100,000 Jews, of whom about 10 per cent belong to one of three religious communities: the Neolog Mazsihisz, Chabad Emih, and Orthodox Maoih.
In April, the latter two took the Mazsihisz to the Supreme Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem, claiming the latter receives a disproportionate allocation of state resources and funds associated with the restitution of property seized by the Nazis.
The Mazsihisz claims Emih declined to negotiate with them over funding and accused Chabad of “trying to transform and destroy the modern and open Hungarian Jewish community” in order to replace it “with an insular and exclusionary one”.
