Fauda-style undercover IDF soldiers disguised as beggars and vegetable sellers were key to Israel’s daring plot to assassinate the Hamas commander known as the ‘Master of Camouflage’ last month, the JC can reveal.

Until now the details of how the Israelis pulled off the assassination of Mohammed Deif, Hamas’s most senior military commander and architect of the October 7 massacre, were unknown.

But that the missile attack which killed him – and his deputy, Rafa Salama – last month only came after a secret operation within Gaza by an undercover IDF team that pinpointed his location.

Based on interviews with security sources, it can now be reported that one agent posed as a market stallholder, selling vegetables outside the building Deif was believed to visit regularly.

The JC can also reveal that the Israeli agents’ exit plan had to change at the last minute.

This new account of the audacious mission comes amid feverish speculation about Israel's assassination methods, which have recently claimed the scalps of two out of three of Hamas’s top leaders, Deif and Ismail Haniyeh, as well as Hezbollah's number two, Fuad Shukr. In recent weeks the JC has revealed the secrets of the similarly spectacular killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran as well as the hostage rescue in June that secured the release of Noa Argamani and three other Israeli captives.

Also taken out: Deif's deputy, Rafa Salama

The revelations underscore both Israel's determination to bring justice to its enemies and the capabilities of its intelligence gathering, which are key to deterring its enemies and averting war.

The foundation of the operation was the Israelis’ discovery that Deif had stopped following his basic security protocols. They had been aware for months that he had become a regular visitor to displaced Gazans at the al-Mawasi tent complex on the Gazan coast. The pattern was almost always the same: prior to his visits, Deif would enter an apartment building near the complex where he would meet fellow Hamas operatives to receive updates on the Israeli army’s movements in the area, as well as the situation regarding food and medical supplies for the displaced Gazans.

After receiving reliable information from local collaborators and Israeli undercover units in the area about the timing of Deif’s possible next visit, the IDF began planning his assassination. Assessing the intelligence, they were startled to realise that Deif, who had been taking stringent security precautions for 30 years, mysteriously had started to disregard this norm and had taken to staying in the same residential building, west of Khan Younis. After this fact was checked repeatedly, since the Israelis feared that Deif might in reality have been using different disguises during his visits, they realised it presented an opportunity to take advantage of this unprecedented failure by the “Master of Camouflage”, the nickname given to him owing to his extreme caution following 30 years of failed attempts to eliminate him.

Surveillance missions by drones and IDF aircraft began to send information to Israel’s command and control room. The “Dovdevan” undercover team, whose activities were featured in the TV series Fauda, arrived in the area and began trawling through the displaced populace. Some posed as Unrwa workers coming to deliver aid, some as Muslim religious figures who had come to lift the spirits of the evacuees. The covers they used were chosen for their ability to develop physical and verbal contact with the displaced Gazans so as to collect as much intelligence as possible.

Two other undercover agents were stationed in the campsite area. Their responsibility was to record the time of Deif’s arrival. One disguised himself as a vegetable stallholder, positioning his pitch immediately in front of the building’s main entrance, from where Deif was expected to enter. The other sat close to the same entrance, disguised as an old man and dressed in ragged clothes, appearing to be an elderly beggar.

On Saturday July 13 news spread among the Gazans that their hero Deif was coming to visit. After the undercover team members had passed this information to the command room in Israel, the security cabinet swiftly granted authorisation for the operation to commence. In the absence of an exact time for Deif’s arrival, the air force commander directed two fighter jets to hover over the area, high enough not to be spotted. They flew on alert for seven hours, waiting for Deif to enter the building.

Then one of the pilots detected suspicious movements of armed Hamas operatives to the east of the encampment, in an area intended to be an escape route for the undercover Israeli agents. The operation commander was concerned that it might jeopardise their safety so a new exit plan was hatched. The commander of the covert force on the ground was directed to head towards the sea (only 100 metres away) once Deif had been sighted entering the building, rather than eastward towards Israel, as had been planned. The commander immediately relayed the message to his disguised fighters through a tiny earpiece tucked into their ears.

After several anxious hours, both in the control room in Israel and among the forces in the field, Deif was finally seen entering the building. The signal was given and the ground forces quietly and calmly made their way towards the sea, as if they were strolling through a street in Tel Aviv. They were then picked up by an IDF ship without arousing suspicion.

Five minutes later, the two planes began phased attacks on the target, with the first hitting the building and completely destroying it. The second plane then laid a belt of fire with tiny bombs around the building to discourage Hamas operatives from attempting to rescue Deif and Salama from the flames. The final stage involved firing a bunker-penetrating missile that could reach beneath the building. Israel’s informants had reported that the building had an underground floor, so the pilots had to utilise a sophisticated missile capable of first penetrating the building and then the ground floor before exploding.

The assumption was that Deif would try to flee to the ground floor and, according to intelligence acquired after the incident, he did just that – which is why it took the IDF two weeks to confirm Deif’s death, as the rubble surrounding his body needed to be cleared.

The death of his deputy, Salama, however, was confirmed the day after the attack because he was killed on the first floor.

Deif was among Hamas’ first members. He was arrested by Israel in 1989 and spent 16 months in administrative detention charged with involvement in a terrorist organisation. When released, he formed the Al-Qassam Brigades with the aim of capturing Israeli soldiers. He engineered the Gaza tunnels and was the first to develop the tactic of launching rockets from the Gaza Strip.

In 2002, he survived an assassination attempt that cost him one of his eyes, a leg and an arm. The most recent assassination attempt on him occurred in 2014, when his wife and son were killed in the Sheikh Radwan neighbourhood of Gaza.

Even though Deif’s death has been confirmed beyond doubt, Hamas continues to deny it. Most obviously, it does not want to demoralise its fighters. But another reason Hamas denied Deif’s death was to confound Israeli intelligence and cast doubt on its sources and agents.

Gazans do not always believe the claims of Hamas, however, and there are mounting signs of resentment at the manner in which it is handling the war. Israeli intelligence unit 8200 has disclosed intercepted calls between angry Gazans expressing their outrage at Hamas.

In one of the overheard conversations between two Gazan merchants, one says angrily, “They killed Deif! Inshallah, they will kill Sinwar too.” His friend responds, “Inshallah. I wish.”

Munir Jaroub, a senior Fatah official said: “Hamas does not care about Gazans and instead employs them as a human shield, which is why there have been so many casualties among Gaza Strip residents.”

Elon Perry’s new book, Children in War, is based on real events about vulnerable Israeli children in the shadow of constant war and poverty. As an adult, one enlists in an Israeli commando unit to take revenge on the enemy who wrecked his childhood. It is available here.