Channel 12 added that the suspected confessed to Israeli interrogators that he was a double agent and had provided false information.
A separate report, from Ynet, did not mention the alleged confession but claimed that the man in question if a mid-ranking Hamas official and that many in the group were aware of the planned attacks by October 6.
Since the attacks, the Shin Bet has suggested that it was short of vital intelligence which could have helped prepare for the incursion.
The agency’s outgoing director, Ronen Bar, said last month: “After years on many fronts, in one night on the southern front, the sky fell.
“All systems collapsed. The Shin Bet also failed to provide early warning.”
During the same address, given at an event honouring fallen Shin Bet operatives, Bar announced his resignation, ending a long-running public spat with Prime Minister Netanyahu over, among other issues, who would shoulder responsibility for the security failings on October 7.
Meanwhile, in February, the IDF released its first report into the day, which it called “one of the greatest failures” in its history.
It revealed that, until the morning of October 7, the army treated Gaza as a “secondary threat” to Hezbollah to the north and that the first signs of the impending attacks were detected at 9pm the night before, but no mitigating plans were made.
Warning signs included preparations for mass rocket fire, operatives entering tunnels, and the activation of dozens of Israeli SIM cards inside the Strip.
The report also found that the IDF bases that were attacked by Hamas were operating with reduced personnel as it was Simchat Torah.
