As I write, it’s less than 24 hours since the astonishing events on Flydubai flight FZ1073. We already know a lot about what happened on board, and there’s been much speculation – some obviously well-informed and some no less obviously uninformed – about the broader picture of who was responsible and what they intended .
But there is one element of that broader picture which has barely been mentioned – despite it being revelatory as to the wider context of Middle East diplomacy and the future of Israel’s relations with its neighbours.
When the Abraham Accords were first signed in September 2020 they were sniffily dismissed as no more than a fluffy “let’s be nice to each other” PR stunt by many observers. The Biden administration acted as though they didn’t exist, and even more recently there has been little outside focus on their importance in the region.
But within the Middle East the Abraham Accords have been transformative, with a direct and key impact on diplomatic relations and security. At its most basic level, consider the background of those involved in yesterday’s flight. The airline is Dubai-based, flying into Israel. The pilot is reportedly Omani. It’s notable that Oman is not a signatory. Under the security aspect of the Accords, the UAE is supposed to carry out relevant checks on pilots flying into Israel. This has been a huge leap forward since the Accords were signed – and correspondingly, if it turns out that the UAE’s security checks were too lax it would be a big deal, which would undermine much of the progress made since 2020.
On the other hand, the cooperation with the Saudis since the plane landed in Riyadh yesterday is an encouraging development, given how there has been much focus on the need to bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accord fold to turbocharge their impact. Cooperation in investigating the full story of Flydubai flight FZ1073 between the Saudis, the UAE and Israel is, in that context, an important development.
It is generally under-appreciated how deeply the Accords have impacted security in the region. In January 2021, for example, the US changed how it categorised Israel within the Pentagon, moving it from EUCOM (US European Command) to CENTCOM (US Central Command), the area of responsibility that includes the Middle East – a key shift in the security perception of Israel within the US which made it administratively possible for the first time for Israeli and Gulf officers to sit in the same planning rooms. One consequence of this was seen on 13–14 April 2024, when Iran launched its direct drone and missile barrage at Israel: Jordan (and Saudi Arabia and the UAE in less visible roles), contributed radar tracking and airspace access to a coalition intercept effort that brought down the large majority of incoming munitions.
The long term aim of this cooperation is an early-warning network stretching across the Gulf and Israel. Although progress has been slow – the Gulf states do not want to create a formal anti-Iran bloc, however much they are desperate to be part of an informal bloc – it is nonetheless light years ahead of where it was before the Accords.
That cooperation can also be seen in Israeli exports of air-defence and counter-drone systems and surveillance technology, as well as the maritime security cooperation that followed the Accords, such as joint naval exercises in the Red Sea involving Israel, the US, Bahrain and the UAE.
This was all put to its most severe test by the Gaza war – and it has held firm. No signatory has broken with the Accords, although the aim of expanding them has stalled. According to the Abraham Accords Peace Institute's 2024 report, trade between Israel and the Accord countries fell by only 4 percent after the war started, against an 18 percent fall in Israel's overall trade.
But the Iran war has had a profound impact, not least pushing the UAE and Bahrain into open military cooperation with Israel.
The war began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026, to which Iran responded by attacking every Gulf Cooperation Council state. The UAE was hit with more than 2,800 Iranian missiles and drones, more than any other country (including Israel). As a result it moved closer to Washington and Israel: the US ambassador to the UN confirmed the UAE had received and used Israel's Iron Dome.
One thing the history of the Middle East makes very clear is that unexpected events can have a transformational impact. The Trump administration has already been refocused on bringing the Saudis in to the Accords. In November 2025 Mohammed bin Salman told Trump that he wanted to join, but only with a clear path to a two-state solution. In July Trump said the newly signed US-Saudi civil nuclear deal was contingent on Riyadh joining.
It may well be that the forced landing in Saudi Arabia of a flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv, and the sudden need for deep intelligence cooperation between the three nations involved – Israel, the UAE and the Saudis – could turn out to be the latest unexpected event which transforms the history of the region.
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