A force that turns a blind eye to Hezbollah while tying the hands of the IDF does not help prevent war; it is a recipe for it.
July 15, 2025 13:55
In November 2024, two months into Israel’s ground offensive in Lebanon, a unit of reservists from the IDF’s 9th Brigade made a disturbing discovery: a Hezbollah terror training compound nestled in the hills of south-west Lebanon. The site was used by Hezbollah operatives to train for operations against the IDF, to study Israeli combat doctrine, and to stockpile large quantities of weaponry.
Inside the compound, soldiers found fully loaded rocket launchers pointed toward Israeli communities, as well as operational manuals, maps of Israeli towns, detailed explanations of IDF equipment, and diagrams of tunnels and weapons systems. It was a textbook Hezbollah base – sophisticated, dangerous, and illegal under international agreements.
But what truly shocked Israeli forces was the base’s location – just 200 metres from a post of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, better known as Unifil. This wasn’t merely happening near Unifil’s area of operation – it was taking place literally in its backyard. And it wasn’t the first time.
This discovery was only the latest example of a long-standing problem: Unifil, whose mandate is to prevent precisely this kind of Hezbollah military entrenchment in southern Lebanon, has become ineffectual at best – and, at worst, an unwitting enabler of Hezbollah’s military expansion.
Originally established in 1978 and later expanded following the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Unifil was tasked with assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces in ensuring that southern Lebanon remained free of Hezbollah forces.
Under the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended that war, Unifil was supposed to serve as a buffer force, monitoring the ceasefire and ensuring that Hezbollah could not rebuild its military infrastructure in the area.
Today, the mission consists of roughly 10,000 soldiers from dozens of countries and operates on a budget of more than $500 million (£370 million). But what has Israel received for this enormous international investment? Only trouble.
Over time, Hezbollah systematically worked to neuter Unifil’s effectiveness. The group has repeatedly blocked peacekeepers from entering certain areas, often using civilians to create human shields or stage protests to deny access.
Rather than confronting Hezbollah, Unifil forces often backed down. Israeli officials, recognising the futility, eventually stopped sharing intelligence with the force – either because nothing would be done or, worse, because the information might be leaked to Hezbollah.
Prior to the 2024 war, any tour of the Israeli-Lebanese border revealed the full extent of Unifil’s failure. Hezbollah had established more than 30 outposts in open view along the border, in direct violation of Resolution 1701. Many of these were manned by the elite Radwan Unit and served as observation posts to gather intelligence on Israeli movements. Others were used as staging grounds for tunnel digging and cross-border infiltration planning.
During the war, things did not improve. On multiple occasions, when Hezbollah attacked Israeli positions, Unifil forces either remained inside their bases or – when they ventured out – interfered with IDF operations. When Israel requested that Unifil temporarily vacate an area to allow for military activity, the peacekeepers refused, citing their mandate and right to remain. But when Israel then asked Unifil to take action against Hezbollah violations, the response was silence.
Since the end of hostilities, the diplomatic structure of the ceasefire has changed. The primary communication channel between Israel and Lebanon is now mediated by the United States and France. While Unifil still technically has a seat at the table, its role has been relegated to that of a passive observer with little authority or influence. In addition, the new Lebanese government has sent its own forces to southern Lebanon where they are rounding up Hezbollah weapons and destroying positions, doing more in weeks than what Unifil did over years.
The result is that in Israel today there is broad consensus across the political and security establishment: Unifil is not only ineffective – it is counterproductive. It fails to enforce its mandate, it cannot deter Hezbollah, and when it does act, it often hinders the IDF more than it helps. For this reason, Israel has been lobbying the Trump administration not to support another renewal of Unifil’s mandate, which is up for vote at the UN Security Council next month.
“Unifil is not only ineffective – it is harmful,” said Lt. Col. (res.) Sarit Zehavi, a former IDF intelligence officer and current director of the Alma Research and Education Centre. “The problem is not the mandate – it’s the lack of willingness to act. Since its establishment, Unifil has had numerous opportunities to change, but no effort has been made to alter the organisation’s behaviour. There is no reason to believe that renewing or updating the mandate will change reality.”
Israeli officials raised the issue recently in meetings with US officials, who initially expressed support for Israel’s position and a willingness to reevaluate the mandate. However, not all in the administration agree. Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey and President Trump’s special envoy to Lebanon, has reportedly advocated for Unifil to remain, in part due to pressure from France, which sees the force as a vital diplomatic tool for maintaining its influence in Lebanon.
“France wants to continue to influence what is happening in Lebanon and sees Unifil as a vehicle to be able to do that,” explained one senior Israeli official.
That divergence within the administration sets up a potentially contentious debate in the weeks ahead. But for Israel, the situation is clear: the continued presence of a force that turns a blind eye to Hezbollah while tying the hands of the IDF does not help prevent war, it is a recipe for it.
That is why the renewal of Unifil’s mandate cannot be treated as a simple diplomatic formality. It is an opportunity to correct course and recognise that peacekeeping only works when peacekeepers are willing to fight for the peace. Anything less not only fails the region - it endangers it.
The writer is co-founder of MEAD, co-author of While Israel Slept, about the October 7 Hamas attacks, a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute, and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post
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