3 min read
ByJonathan Rynhold, Jonathan Rynhold
On the Israeli-Palestinian track, Mr Trump began by stating that he would give resolving the conflict "one hell of a shot", with the US in the role of a neutral broker
November 10, 2016 11:55Under President Trump there may well be less friction between the US and Israel's right-wing government. However, in an underlying sense, Israel will be less secure. There are two major reasons for this: first, Mr Trump's temperament; and second, his isolationist instincts.
Mr Trump appears to be erratic; not a personality trait one looks for in the supreme commander of the US armed forces. The American constitution divides power between the president, Congress and the Supreme Court. But when it comes to foreign policy, the president is dominant. If Mr Trump listens to experienced advisers, this could help matters. However, during the campaign, many Republican foreign policy experts, especially those that are pro-Israel, stated publicly that they would not serve under Mr Trump, who they view as reckless and abhorrent. On the other hand, as one such expert explained to me a couple of months ago, if Mr Trump actually became president that would put them in a dilemma, as some would feel a duty to serve in order to protect the republic from disaster.
On the substance of policy, Mr Trump has flip-flopped so often that one cannot be sure what his position is on any given subject. As one senior Republican senator told me when
I enquired about his foreign policy: "I got nothing for you."
The two policy issues at the core of US-Israeli relations will be Iran and the Palestinians. On Iran, Mr Trump has been clear that he thinks Barack Obama did a bad nuclear deal; however he has been less clear on what he intends to do about this. During the campaign he spoke both of cancelling and renegotiating the deal and enforcing it in a tough manner, though the latter has been the dominant theme.
Notably, unlike many Republicans in Congress, and other Republican presidential candidates, he did not formally pledge to rip up the deal.
On the Israeli-Palestinian track, Mr Trump began by stating that he would give resolving the conflict "one hell of a shot", with the US in the role of a neutral broker and that he would not commit to recognising Jerusalem as Israel's capital. However, Mr Trump subsequently reversed his neutrality and his position on Jerusalem. In addition, his advisers are now stating that he is not committed to the two-state solution, and that peace-making is not a priority. Regarding settlements, Mr Trump's advisers have stated that he would not dictate where Israel can and cannot build. These later positions are in tune with attitudes among rank and file Republicans and if they were enacted would make for a significant reduction in tension over the issue with the Israeli government. However, it would also make the Palestinians disgruntled, which might further weaken the relatively moderate PA, with negative consequences for Israeli-Palestinian security co-operation.
Despite the fact that Mrs Clinton's positions on the Palestinians are more challenging for Mr Netanyahu than those of Mr Trump, the Prime Minister refrained from signalling a preference. In contrast, in 2012 he tacitly endorsed the Republican candidate, Mitt Romney. This attests to concerns about Mr Trump's reliability, which have already affected Israeli policy regarding US military aid.
In March, Mr Trump flirted with cutting aid to Israel, though in September he referred to aid to Israel as "an investment". His advisers now claim that he would look favourably on providing more aid to Israel than mandated by Mr Obama's $38 billion, 10-year aid package. Yet part of the reason the risk-averse Mr Netanyahu signed the aid agreement with Mr Obama, despite the fact that it grants aid on less favourable terms than previously, was concern that President Trump could not be relied upon on this issue.But US aid constitutes only one per cent of Israel's GDP. Far more significant is the foreign policy strategy that Mr Trump intends to pursue. This is where there is the greatest cause for concern.
Israel benefits hugely from an internationalist and assertive America. When the US takes a step back, as it did under Mr Obama, the vacuum is filled by greater instability and forces that are unfriendly or hostile to Israel. Mr Trump is far more isolationist than Mr Obama. His is a "fortress America" strategy, and he has openly questioned whether the US would stand behind its alliance commitments. If the US cannot be relied upon to protect Nato allies to which it is formally committed by treaty, can it be relied upon to stand behind friends like Israel, to whom it is not formally obliged to defend? Such doubts may embolden Israel's enemies. Still, Israel can look after itself, and fears of American unreliability may push Egypt and Saudi Arabia to deepen their strategic co-operation with Israel.
Mr Trump also opposes US intervention in Syria, being relaxed about the growth of Russian and Iranian power there; more bad news for Israel. He seems content to let those powers "police" the area and deal with Daesh. Israel, however, views Iran as more of a threat than Daesh. True, Mr Trump has said he would use force to stop Iran obtaining nuclear weapons, but in the interim his approach would allow Iran and its proxy Hizbollah to increase their power, thereby multiplying the costs of confronting Iran in the future.
Mr Trump's strategy constitutes a major break from the post-Second World War Republican tradition. The last time isolationism dominated Republican thinking was during the 1930s. Mr Trump's strategy may well be something that will be keeping Israel's prime minister up at night.
Jonathan Rynhold is a Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University
