Recently, I met with Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten to present to him the depressing findings of our study of online antisemitism. It is a large-scale study that quite clearly displays the extent of a digital pathology that has become entrenched and normalised in the Netherlands. And it is profoundly concerning.
Online antisemitism in the Netherlands has not only grown since 2021, but has also hardened in tone, expanded across ideological and political domains, and become deeply embedded in the architecture of the digital public sphere.
The Centre for Information and Documentation on Israel (CIDI) is, and has been for many decades, the only organisation in the Netherlands that monitors antisemitism and provides research, analysis, and public information on antisemitism and Israel. Our study, Online antisemitism 2021–2024, which was published in mid-June, is based on the analysis of more than 105 million public posts across 15 platforms.
The figures are clear. The share of antisemitic messages online doubled between 2021 and 2024, while direct antisemitic threats against Jews – ranging from calls for street violence to calls for mass extermination – have increased fivefold. The use of explicitly antisemitic language has also risen dramatically. Particularly alarming is the fact that only 30 to 35 per cent of posts about Jews are neutral or positive, compared with 63 to 70 per cent in general online discourse.
The most important finding is not only scale, but persistence. The Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, mark a clear turning point. Since then, antisemitic content has increased and has not returned to previous pre-2023 levels. Instead, it has stabilised at a permanently elevated level. What we are witnessing is not a cycle of rise and decline in response to events – such as a temporary pandemic – but rather a ratchet effect: each shock permanently pushes the norm upwards.
Antisemitic content was – and still is – found primarily in far-right online environments. Traditional conspiracy theories about alleged Jewish power and control remain widespread there, as do Holocaust denial and Holocaust trivialisation. The research also shows that foreign influence has grown from being virtually undetectable in 2021 to becoming a structural factor in 2024, contributing to the spread of antisemitic narratives across online networks.
While far-right and conspiracy-driven environments remain central, the landscape has broadened in recent years, with antisemitic content increasingly appearing in far-left and activist echo chambers where the war between Israel and Hamas has become a dominant theme. In 2024, 42 per cent of antisemitic content consists of anti-Israel and anti-Zionist framing, compared with 18 per cent in 2021. This does not mean that political criticism of Israel is equivalent to antisemitism, but in practice we increasingly see Jews in the diaspora being held responsible for the actions of the Israeli government. They are addressed and expected to account for Israel and to demonstrate their “position” by speaking out against the Jewish state and thereby proving themselves to be a “good Jew”. In many online discussions, the word “Israel” is replaced by “the Jews”, turning Jews into a collective target of blame and attack.
Online, antisemitic rhetoric and imagery are also frequently used to attack Israel. Holocaust comparisons are regularly made, equating the situation in Gaza with the murder of six million Jews, or claiming that Jews “have learned nothing from their own history”. We also see frequent inversion narratives, in which Jews are portrayed as perpetrators, with statements such as “you are doing now what the Nazis once did”.
However, online antisemitism also manifests in more subtle ways, albeit no less harmful or venomous. Humorous memes or seemingly ironic images and short videos that are widely shared online. Dog whistles – subtle references only understood by insiders – such as “juice” symbolism, are frequently used. To outsiders, these expressions may appear harmless, but among insiders they function as powerful carriers of antisemitic ideas. For example, “The Happy Merchant” caricature explicitly portrays Jews through stereotypes of money and financial control, sometimes, with or without references to Israeli military imagery. Within the online environment, antisemitism has adapted to the present age: it evolves alongside social and geopolitical developments, yet remains rooted in deeply entrenched antisemitic patterns that continue to reappear in new forms.
What makes this even worse is the way social media operates. Algorithms primarily show users content that reinforces their existing beliefs. As a result, people become trapped in informational bubbles, with no exposure to opposing views. All of this content disproportionately affects young people, who receive much of their information online.
And most concerning of all: online antisemitism does not, of course, remain confined to the screen. What is normalised online does not stay online. It translates into the real world, contributing directly to growing antisemitic hostility and violence.
From a Dutch perspective, this also demonstrates that legislation and regulation are insufficient. Stronger action must be taken against online hate. Platforms should be required to remove harmful content more quickly and actively moderate what circulates on their services. It is also necessary to take a closer look at the role of large online accounts and influencers. They sometimes reach millions of people but are not subject to the same obligations as traditional media, despite their influence on public discourse being just as significant.
This must change. Prime Minister Rob Jetten promised to take it seriously and to take steps to address online antisemitism. It is essential that he does.
Naomi Mestrum is Director of CIDI
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