The vulnerability of this moment is most visible in Gaza.
Three months after the ceasefire went into effect and the last living hostages were returned, Hamas is once again exercising control over roughly half of the Gaza Strip. According to Israeli intelligence officials, the terror organisation has replenished its ranks, re-established its grip over the flow of goods entering the territory, and reclaimed the distribution networks that double as both patronage systems and instruments of intimidation.
Palestinians return to their homes in Gaza a week after ceasefire came into effect in October (Photo by EYAD BABA/AFP via Getty Images)AFP via Getty Images
Fear rules once again in much of Gaza. Any trace of public dissent has been crushed. Civilians who dared to protest Hamas’s misrule have disappeared from the streets. Rebuilding is not advancing, not for lack of funds but because no international actor can guarantee that assistance will not simply replenish Hamas’s war machine.
Israel maintains military dominance over the remaining portion of Gaza, but the situation is tenuous and increasingly constrained by external pressure. Phase Two of US President Donald Trump’s much-discussed 20-point Gaza plan was designed to break this deadlock: disarm Hamas, deploy an International Stabilisation Force, create alternative governance, and begin reconstruction.
But today no one can explain how Phase Two is actually supposed to work. Who will disarm Hamas? What mechanism will prevent funds earmarked for Gaza from flowing into terror tunnels instead of schools and hospitals? Who will exercise real authority over Gaza’s civil administration? And what became of the International Stabilisation Force that was meant to serve as the plan’s security backbone?
President Trump with President Herzog and Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel in October, shortly after the ceasefire (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)Getty Images
Instead, Israel now faces mounting diplomatic pressure to withdraw from the so-called “green zone”, the eastern buffer territory it currently controls inside Gaza. The American view is that Israeli presence itself prevents Phase Two from advancing. The logic is simple: remove the IDF, and Hamas will agree to withdraw from governance.
But this logic collides with the central lesson of October 7: Hamas exploits vacuums. Every Israeli withdrawal without an enforcement mechanism becomes an invitation for terror to regenerate.
If faced with a direct ultimatum from Washington – pull out or lose American backing for the next stage – Jerusalem will find itself in a tough bind. All signs suggest this moment is approaching and that Trump might demand an Israeli withdrawal in exchange for vague promises regarding Hamas governance, rather than verifiable disarmament.
Is there a way forward that preserves Israel’s security while denying Hamas the ability to reconstitute itself?
Possibly. But doing so would require political courage: forging regional coalitions, empowering local alternatives to Hamas rule, anchoring international forces with real enforcement authority, and negotiating binding security arrangements. None of that happens by default. It requires proactive leadership willing to spend political capital and confront ideological factions at home.
And that political will remains absent.
The same dynamic plays out on Israel’s northern frontier with Syria.
No one yet knows what direction Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, will ultimately take the country. One year ago, he was affiliated with al-Qaeda. Today, Trump is attempting to coax him onto a path of cautious moderation under American patronage.
Former jihadi, now President of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa addresses UN General Assembly in September (Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images)Getty Images
This effort is not naive appeasement. The US is testing whether the former jihadists can be incentivised into state-building roles that effectively exclude Iranian proxies and Hezbollah from Syrian territory. A few weeks ago, Syrian security forces intercepted weapons shipments destined for Hezbollah, actions publicly praised by US Central Command leadership.
From Washington’s perspective, something potentially meaningful is forming: an emerging Syrian regime aligned against Iranian influence, even if still deeply unstable and ideologically compromised.
Israel’s response, however, has been reflexively confrontational rather than strategically adaptive.
The high-profile visit by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz to Syrian territory at the end of November achieved little except angering Damascus and irritating the White House. Likewise, the IDF operation in Beit Jinn in southern Syria was publicly condemned by Trump.
The question that hovers uncomfortably: Are these moves truly necessary to Israel’s immediate security, or do they reflect an inability to calibrate military vigilance with diplomatic flexibility?
Certainly, Israel cannot afford naivety. October 7 proved that complacency is fatal. No territory can be ceded without ironclad security guarantees.
Yet the pursuit of absolute tactical control must coexist with the pursuit of diplomatic opportunities. Security environments evolve. Military strength must be leveraged to create political outcomes, not merely extended to preserve temporary advantages.
Clausewitz’s observation remains painfully relevant: war is politics by other means. In other words: battlefield success without political conclusion is a recipe for perpetual conflict.
This failure to translate strength into statecraft is not confined to Israel’s borders. It permeates the domestic political arena as well.
By October, Israel will head back to the polls. Those elections will determine whether the country capitalises on the strategic realignments unfolding around it or remains trapped in internal paralysis.
Yet even with elections approaching, a sense of stagnation prevails. Policy movement is paralysed. Regional normalisation awaits. Social cohesion continues to erode as controversial legislation – particularly the proposed ultra-Orthodox draft-evasion law – advances through the Knesset, deepening divisions over burdens of service.
And then there is Netanyahu’s request for a pardon, a decision on which by President Isaac Herzog will influence whether Israel can break the political deadlock.
Granting a pardon could enable the formation of a broad unity government free of extremist dependencies – potentially opening space for substantive diplomatic moves and internal reforms. But such a decision would provoke fury from Netanyahu’s opponents, many of whom view the trial as sacrosanct.
Refusing to grant a pardon, however, will not hurt Netanyahu. It will solidify his base and reinforce claims of persecution and deep-state conspiracies, locking Israel into another cycle of polarising politics.
No option offers a clean resolution.
Compounding this dilemma is the looming battle over Israel’s commission of inquiry into October 7.
The government has been pushing legislation to empower it to establish the commission itself and appoint its members – a move widely viewed as an attempt to limit accountability. The opposition insists that any such panel must be formed under Israel’s existing state inquiry framework to ensure independence and legitimacy.
Israel enters 2026 safer than it was going into October 7. Hezbollah’s deterrence has been weakened. Hamas’s command structure has been decimated. Iran’s campaign has suffered rare setbacks. Quiet channels of Arab-Israeli coordination continue to deepen beneath the surface.
But security gains alone will not secure the future.
The path to normalisation with Saudi Arabia remains obstructed by Israel’s political constraints. Netanyahu’s coalition, for example, cannot utter the words Riyadh needs to hear: “We are committed to a political process.”
Without internal political coherence, Israel cannot fully exploit the regional realignment taking shape.
The wars of the past two years proved that Israel retains the will and capacity to defend itself with extraordinary effectiveness. But the fate of those achievements will be determined not by generals, pilots, or infantry units - but by politicians willing to lead.
Israel ended 2025 safer than it began. Whether it is entering 2026 stronger remains an open question.]
The writer is a co-founder of the MEAD policy forum, a senior fellow at JPPI, and a former editor-in-chief of the Jerusalem Post. His newest book is While Israel Slept.
