The numbers just don’t support the UN-backed Gaza famine report

Some media outlets reported that the IPC had quietly changed its rules for Gaza by lowering the bar: instead of requiring 30 per cent of children to be malnourished based on the so-called Weight‑for‑Height-Z-Score (WHZ) – the gold‑standard measure – it allowed famine to be declared if just 15 per cent were malnourished using the simpler Mid-Upper Arm Circumference check (MUAC). Critics argued this was a rewriting of the criteria that made famine far easier to declare.

The truth is more nuanced. The first part of the claim – that IPC literally rewrote the criteria or invented a new one – is incorrect. MUAC and the 15 per cent figure already appear in the 2019 IPC manual as possible, but lower‑certainty, evidence. However, the 15 per cent figure comes with an important caveat. Since body shape and physique differ across populations – an arm circumference that signals critical wasting in one region may be perfectly normal in another – the IPC guidance requires MUAC findings to be interpreted against local typical MUAC rates and their relationship with WHZ.

Globally, MUAC rates usually come out lower than WHZ, which is why a lower threshold can sometimes be justified. In Gaza, however, the pattern was reversed: before the war, about 4 per cent of children fell below the MUAC cut‑off, versus only 0.8 per cent by WHZ. In other words, in Gaza MUAC tended to classify far more children as malnourished than WHZ. Treating the 15 per cent MUAC reference point as if it were a famine threshold in that context significantly lowered the evidentiary bar and bent IPC’s own rules – making a famine declaration much easier than the rules actually allowed.

However, using an unjustifiably low threshold was only part of the problem. The much bigger issue was that the IPC discarded half of the available data and misrepresented what the remainder actually showed. The key claim for declaring famine was that child malnutrition had surged from around 10 per cent in early July to 16 per cent later in the month, supposedly crossing the famine line. But this “trend” can’t be backed up by the data.

In reality, the IPC based its conclusion on only half of the July sample, covering about 7,500 children, which gave an average of roughly 16 per cent. The full dataset of more than 15,000 children showed rates closer to 12 per cent – well below the famine threshold. Even within the partial sample, the claim of a dramatic upward trend did not hold: the numbers remained flat across the month with no increase at all. By failing to use the complete data, the IPC created the illusion of both a breach and a surge that never occurred.

The same pattern played out with mortality, the second key pillar of a famine declaration. The IPC analysis quietly admitted that reported deaths were below the famine threshold, but then suggested that many deaths might not have been counted. What they did not spell out is just how enormous the gap really was.

For Gaza City, the famine line would have meant about 180 excess deaths every single day from hunger or related disease. The actual reported figure was about six deaths per day across the entire Strip – nowhere near the threshold. Even if every one of those deaths had been in Gaza City, the rate would still have been more than 30 times lower than the famine threshold.

Of course, in any war zone some deaths may go unreported. But to claim that actual excess mortality was 30 times higher than the numbers on record is an extraordinary leap. And as the late Carl Sagan famously said: “Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” The IPC did not provide such evidence. Instead, it relied on speculation and on a few highly controversial studies that were far from sufficient to support claims of hundreds of unreported starvation-related deaths per day. Yet it was precisely this assumption that underpinned the famine declaration.

In addition, the report downplayed or ignored positive signs of recovery, such as increased aid deliveries, falling food prices, and expanded humanitarian access. Observers have also noted that at least one of its authors has a record of anti‑Israel bias.

Taken together, these issues raise serious questions not only about the technical rigour of the analysis, but also about its objectivity and neutrality. In short, the evidence presented by the IPC did not even come close to justifying the use of a famine designation. By lowering the bar and relying on speculation, the report turned a situation of undeniable hardship into a claim of catastrophic collapse that the data simply did not support.

​Dr Mark Zlochin is a independent researcher and data analyst