Netanyahu’s Gaza options are limited but the biggest constraints are self-inflicted

The protests themselves do not truly rattle Netanyahu. He has long viewed such rallies as political noise, and as long as the participants were not his voters, they do not truly bother him. What would alarm him is if the unrest were to spread into the IDF or the economy – if, for example, senior IDF officers resigned in protest, or the Histadrut labor union called a nationwide strike. Neither seems imminent.

Smotrich is a different kind of problem. Netanyahu knows his survival depends on keeping Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir inside the coalition. For nearly two years, the two have pushed for more aggressive military operations, consistently opposing ceasefires needed for humanitarian aid or negotiations. Their pressure has already forced Netanyahu to prolong the war and stall any real discussion of how it will end.

If Smotrich walks, the coalition will quickly unravel. The ultra-Orthodox parties are already officially out over the IDF draft bill and losing the far-right bloc would leave the government exposed and without a real mandate. While the Knesset is out of session until late October – preventing an immediate vote to disperse – the political reality would be clear: Netanyahu would be dragged to an election he has tried to postpone at all costs.

Paradoxically, Netanyahu may see a strange kind of opportunity in this crossfire. Being attacked by both left and right allows him to present himself as the “responsible adult” in Israeli politics and the leader charting a steady course between two opposing extremes. He can say that he is willing to make unpopular but necessary decisions in the country’s best interest.

The Gaza City plan itself, however, has strategic flaws. After nearly two years of fighting, Israel has not met its core objectives: dismantling Hamas and freeing the hostages. Another operation in a place the IDF has already operated is unlikely to change the war’s outcome. The army is worn down by fatigue, with reservists warning that they do not have the energy to stand if called up again. International legitimacy is at its lowest point ever with Western European capitals openly condemning Israel’s conduct and several countries contemplating sanctions and war crimes investigations.

Netanyahu is acutely aware of these constraints. That is why he stopped short of authorizing a full occupation of Gaza. Instead, the cabinet approved a phased approach: concentrate on Gaza City, avoid the “central camps” where the living hostages are believed to be held, and set a two-month operational window ending in October. In that time, he hopes a hostage deal with Hamas could materialize, rendering the offensive unnecessary.

Diplomatic efforts are running in parallel. On Saturday, Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s special envoy, met the Qatari prime minister in Spain to explore a plan that could end the war and secure the release of all remaining captives. Should such a plan take shape, it could delay or even cancel the Gaza City incursion.

Still, the truth is inescapable: Israel’s options are severely limited.

Some constraints are inevitable. This is the reality of a democratic state with a conventional army fighting a barbaric terrorist organisation that embeds itself among civilians, uses hospitals and schools as military bases, and weaponises the suffering of its own population. Hamas’s strategy depends on civilian deaths, especially those of women and children, to turn global opinion against Israel.

Other constraints are dictated by Hamas’s negotiating style, or, more accurately, its refusal to negotiate sincerely. Israel has made its willingness for a deal abundantly clear, yet Hamas has responded with delays and unrealistic demands. The latest talks in Doha collapsed, with American and Israeli delegations walking out after it became clear that Hamas had no real intention of making concessions.

In the end, Israel cannot negotiate with itself.

With that said, we cannot ignore that the most damaging constraints are self-inflicted. The government has failed to outline a coherent “day after” plan for Gaza. While securing a hostage deal remains the most urgent priority, articulating a credible political vision would signal to the world that Israel’s campaign is more than just about destruction. Netanyahu has consistently avoided doing so, fearing backlash from his political base and coalition partners.

When he does address the future, his proposals often clash with regional realities. On Friday, he announced that postwar Gaza would be governed by an “alternative civilian authority” – neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority.

The problem is that no Arab state prepared to invest in Gaza’s reconstruction accepts this formula. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both made clear they will only participate if the Palestinian Authority has a role in the governing framework.

Netanyahu’s categorical rejection of PA involvement is driven largely by Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, who see the PA as no less hostile than Hamas. By making this a red line, Netanyahu risks leaving Israel to govern Gaza alone after the war, a scenario almost no one in Israel’s security establishment supports, given the cost in lives, resources, and international standing.

And while the Trump administration continues to stand behind Jerusalem, that is today. Western Europe has already shifted away, with leaders in Paris, Madrid, and London openly calling for Palestinian statehood. Even Trump’s patience could wear thin if the war grinds on without visible progress, especially as his political priorities shift in Washington.

Netanyahu may think he is buying time. But in the Middle East, time rarely comes without a price. Every delay erodes Israel’s operational momentum, deepens its diplomatic isolation, and leaves the country more dependent on allies whose support is not guaranteed.

Yaakov Katz is a co-founder of the MEAD policy forum, co-author of While Israel Slept, about the Oct. 7 attack, a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute, and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post