Israel must strike Iran’s regime in the next year while Bibi Netanyahu remains in power. This is the conclusion from the recent conversations I have been having with sources inside Iran including those in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Ayatollah’s ideological army.
Why the deadline? The Iranian regime’s entire strategy for its next stage of escalation against Israel hinges on Prime Minister Bibi Netenyahu’s anticipated ouster in Israel’s October 2026 elections. Put simply: a wounded IRGC is preparing to come back with greater ideological vengeance against the world’s only Jewish state – but only after the departure of the current Israeli prime minister. And this, of course, is far from guaranteed.
The reality is the Ayatollah and the IRGC fear Bibi more than any other world leader – even more so than US President Donald Trump. The perception in Tehran, which is prone to making major miscalculations, is that Trump and the US can be managed and kept at bay for the next three years. The regime’s persistent efforts to influence the Trump administration’s policy on Iran through a charm offensive, despite the unprecedented US strikes on its nuclear facilities, speaks to this somewhat naive conviction.
But, in the mind of the Ayatollah, the same cannot be said about Bibi. There is a deep-rooted and inescapable paranoia that exists in the regime’s psyche when it comes to Bibi, something even the Israelis have yet to fully appreciate.
“The kind of attack we witnessed wouldn’t have taken place without Netenyahu,” a source within the IRGC tells me. This view is not in the minority. Rightly or wrongly, there is a firm belief that the spectacular scale of Israel’s strikes in June – which saw the elimination of senior IRGC commanders and the decimation of much of Iran’s critical nuclear and military infrastructure – simply would not have occurred had Bibi not been in office.
Now, in the aftermath of the conflict, the regime is deeply anxious that the Israeli prime minister has both the personal determination and risk appetite for attack that could go even further. Such a scenario would not only dismantle the IRGC’s rush to bounce back but – if executed correctly – could pose a genuine risk to the existence of the regime. It is precisely for this reason that Tehran’s current post-war strategy is to run down the clock until Israel’s elections in October, whilst it simultaneously uses this inward facing period to recover and strengthen its capabilities for an escalation should Bibi be ousted.
And its efforts to rebuild and prepare for this moment are in full swing. A recent report submitted by the Israeli Defense Forces to the Knesset detailed how Iran’s regime has rapidly resumed large-scale production of its ballistic missiles, effectively recovering its stockpile from the 12-day-war. Ironically, however, the thrust to rapidly bolster its ballistic missile programme is not borne out of defeatism as many outside observers may think. In the delusional but dangerous mindset of the constituency which makes up members of the IRGC, not least the younger ranks I spoke with, an indication of the regime’s “triumph” over Israel in the June war was the success of its ballistic missiles. “Our homemade missiles penetrated the so-called best defence system in the world,” a member of the IRGC’s Basij militia tells me.
This is not to say Tehran is completely delusional and detached from reality. The IRGC is desperately trying to learn the lessons from the 12-day war to make up for any shortcomings. This is indicative of its actions in the post-war phase. Recognising its vulnerability to Israel’s superior air capabilities, for example, there has been a concerted effort by the IRGC to move its military infrastructure deep-underground. Likewise, replacing and upgrade the regime’s air defense systems, through both homegrown production and foreign acquisition, has been described by the chief of the general staff of the armed forces as the most important priority. Beyond this, the IRGC has also simultaneously begun the process of decentralising its military command structures from its central leadership to its Provincial Guard in an attempt to make it harder for Israel to collectively eliminate key decision makers during times of conflict.
Thus, those interpreting Tehran’s current silence as evidence that the Ayatollah has been defeated militarily are misreading the situation. This is not to say the regime isn’t deterred –it is, at least for now – but not for the reason most assume.
And herein lies the paradox: the regime is currently deterred not because it has suffered military defeat, but because of the continued presence of Bibi. In other words, while Bibi remains in office, the Ayatollah and IRGC are highly unlikely to confront Israel, fearing the Israeli prime minster would not limit himself to a tit-for-tat operation.
This presents the Israeli military with a golden opportunity for a preemptive strike against the regime in the next year – one it cannot afford to lose.
But an attack on the regime this time around must be far more comprehensive than in June. Bibi should not only strike military and nuclear targets, but must also dismantle the IRGC’s comprehensive domestic security apparatus and the extensive machinery of the Office of Supreme Leader, both of which were left largely unscathed in June. And this needs to happen from the outset. Such a scenario would, for the very first time, open the space for simultaneous external and internal pressure on the regime.
However, if Israel fails to strike the regime within the next year, it will almost certainly be facing a more extreme and antisemitic IRGC. In an attempt to learn from lessons from the 12-day-war, Tehran has not only been altering its capabilities, but it has also been silently purging its personnel to counter enemy infiltration and tackle incompetence. And this will not be without consequences. To do this, the IRGC is replacing its older cohort with younger and more zealous generations across the different layers of its command structure: from its senior to provincial and operational command. Practically speaking, this has meant the prioritisation of ideological commitment over technical expertise and experience, empowering the most extreme rank and file in the IRGC.
This younger and more ideological zealous cohort are far more extreme in their antisemitism having undergone greater radicalization as a result of changes that were made to the IRGC’s indoctrination programme from 2009 onwards. They have, for example, condemned their seniors for what they regard as “restraint” in both missile attacks on densely populated Israeli cities, and terror attacks against members of the Jewish community globally. This means the world will soon be dealing with a far more aggressive, impatient and reckless IRGC. Of course, the replacement of the older and experienced cohort with younger and more ideologically extreme ranks will increase incompetence and strategic errors within the IRGC.
But as long as Bibi remains at the helm, Israel retains a strategic advantage over the aging Ayatollah. The choice Israel currently faces, therefore, is not between war and peace, as is often framed. Rather, it is between acting while the regime is cautious and weakened, or waiting until it is more capable, radicalised and determined to exact vengeance. Strategic windows in the Middle East rarely remain open for long and this one is already beginning to close. Israel must seize this narrow opportunity and strike the regime in the next year before it is too late.
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