This week, Narendra Modi made history by becoming the first Indian prime minister to address the Knesset. The speech, together with the carefully managed political choreography around it – including Israel’s decision to confer on him the Speaker of the Knesset Medal – was designed to mark a threshold: a public, institutional upgrade of India–Israel ties into an explicit strategic partnership.
The significance of that moment lies not just in ceremony, but in trajectory. Defence cooperation is evolving from buyer–seller transactions to joint defence projects. Economic ties are advancing toward a prospective free trade agreement and collaboration in critical technologies. Joint regional initiatives would position Israel as a critical transport node in India’s wider Middle Eastern and European strategy. Even food, water and climate resilience are entering the strategic frame.
To grasp the full weight of this tremendous shift, it helps to recall the long arc of the relationship. India recognised Israel in 1950, yet for decades approached the relationship with extreme caution. That restraint reflected domestic politics as well as the need to sustain ties across the Arab world, given India’s energy dependence, its large expatriate workforce in the Gulf, and its position in the Non-Alignment Movement.
For much of the post-1992 period, India’s approach could be summarised as quiet cooperation paired with careful public messaging. Israel was a valuable partner in defence and technology, but a file to be managed discreetly so as not to complicate India’s regional relationships or its traditional support for Palestinian aspirations.
Over the past decade, beginning with Modi’s 2017 visit to Israel, India’s prime minister has brought the relationship into the open and recast it as a strategic asset rather than an awkward balancing act. India now pursues a robust partnership with Israel without ritualistically balancing every step with parallel gestures toward the Arab or Palestinian side. New Delhi continues to support a two-state framework, but it no longer allows that position to limit cooperation with Israel.
Modi’s Knesset speech made that recalibration unmistakable. He spoke as the leader of a democracy signalling convergence with another democracy confronting hostile neighbourhoods and terrorism. The new framing emphasised friendship and shared civilisational depth.
Yet defence remains the backbone. Israel has long supplied advanced systems and operational expertise, particularly as India sought to diversify beyond its historic dependence on Russia. That logic has sharpened since Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine disrupted supply chains and diminished Moscow’s reliability as a default supplier.
Yet the shift is also structural. The relationship with Israel is no longer confined to procurement. It increasingly involves co-development and production – crucial in a volatile security environment. During Israel’s war in 2024, media reports pointed to Indian defence exports to Israel – a sensitive issue New Delhi has navigated carefully given its broader diplomatic posture. Whatever the veracity of such reports, India’s defence-industrial base is developing into a supplier in its own right, and the India–Israel ecosystem forms part of that evolution.
From Israel’s perspective, this deepening alignment fits its own strategic priorities: diversifying partnerships beyond its immediate region, strengthening resilience through technological and industrial depth, and building pragmatic coalitions that reduce reliance on any single supplier or diplomatic channel. In that context, India is not simply another market. It is a rising power with a mature security agenda and expanding industrial capacity. A partnership structured around sustainable co-development rather than one-off sales expands Israel’s strategic room for manoeuvre in an era defined by supply-chain shocks and high-tempo conflict.
One of the most consequential elements of Modi’s speech was his explicit reference to IMEC – the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor – and I2U2, the grouping of India, Israel, the UAE and the United States. The signal was clear: Israel is not merely a bilateral partner, but seen as a strategic node in India’s broader economic design and attempts to balance China’s growing infrastructural reach.
For India, the Middle East is central — from energy imports and trade corridors to the welfare of millions of Indian nationals working in the Gulf. Embedding Israel in frameworks such as IMEC and I2U2 also “future-proofs” this relationship, anchoring it in logistics, investment and shared infrastructure rules and practices, which makes cooperation harder to unwind when politics turn volatile.
Economic integration follows naturally. During Modi’s visit, India and Israel launched negotiations toward a bilateral Free Trade Agreement. New Delhi’s ambition is clear: to attain top-tier economic status while building resilient supply chains in strategic technologies – artificial intelligence, cyber, quantum and semiconductors.
These sectors are not merely commercial; they are geopolitical. Israel’s dense innovation ecosystem, with its deep defence–tech crossover, complements India’s scale. The emerging model is integration: joint industrial ecosystems, digital infrastructure and financial connectivity linking innovation to mass production.
The shift toward resilience extends beyond defence and high technology. In India’s strategic calculus, food and water security are also critical. As urbanisation accelerates and climate volatility intensifies, productivity gaps become national vulnerabilities. Israeli expertise in precision irrigation and controlled-environment agriculture, such as greenhouses and vertical farming, offers not just higher yields, but predictability – a strategic asset in an era of systemic risk.
India’s closer alignment with Israel unfolds alongside its effort to remain credible as a leader of the “Global South,” where opinion in many Muslim-majority states has been sharply critical of Israel’s conduct in Gaza. Domestic political sensitivities also remain an issue. Modi’s messaging therefore combines warmth toward Israel with calibrated language: condemnation of terrorism, support for stability, and continued endorsement of a diplomatic framework that keeps India’s two-state position on record.
This is not inconsistency; it is multi-alignment. India is deepening ties with Israel while sustaining working relationships with Arab capitals and engaging the United States and Europe as its interests dictate.
India and Israel have moved beyond cautious distance toward an ambitious strategic partnership. Now comes the harder part: implementing an agenda that matches the rhetoric. Modi’s address set the direction. The next phase will be judged not by symbolism, but by delivery.
Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos is a researcher specialising in India’s foreign and security policy. She is a fellow at the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA), a lecturer at Bar-Ilan University and a member of the Deborah Forum, which promotes women in Israel’s foreign and defence policy community
To get more from opinion, click here to sign up for our free Editor's Picks newsletter.