Jerusalem’s predicament: accept a phased deal that risks leaving Hamas in power, or press ahead with a Gaza City offensive that could endanger the captives but ensure long-term security
August 29, 2025 11:13
Israel’s war with Hamas began on October 7, 2023, after Hamas surprised the IDF, infiltrated Israel, murdered and kidnapped civilians in their homes and at a music festival, raped women, and burned children alive. Before any discussion of the future, it is worth remembering how this war began.
In response to this invasion, Israel declared war, with the stated goals to destroy Hamas as a military organisation, return the hostages (over 250 at the start of the war), and prevent Hamas from continuing its rule over Gaza. The fighting dragged on longer than initially expected, but during this conflict Israel also dealt severe blows to Hezbollah in Lebanon, leaving the group now under pressure from the Lebanese government to disarm. Later, Iran entered into direct confrontation with Israel, and in twelve days of war in June, Israel was able to badly damage Iran’s air-defence capabilities and destroy much of its nuclear project and ballistic missile production capacity.
After these achievements, Israel returned to an intensified campaign in Gaza and now controls about 75% of the Strip. Most Gazans, along with the 20 surviving hostages, remain in areas where the IDF has not yet entered: Gaza City and the camps along the coast in the centre of the Strip. In these areas there are over one million Palestinians, among whom hide 20,000-25,000 Hamas fighters (many of them recent, inexperienced recruits) and the few commanders the group still has.
Hamas no longer functions as the terror-military force it once was. It now operates as a guerrilla organisation. It is capable of sending out cells of up to 20 terrorists, but its main tactics are ambushes, booby-trapped houses, and attacks through tunnels the IDF has not yet destroyed. They remain a danger to IDF troops inside Gaza and would be a challenge to anyone trying to govern the Strip – but in its current state Hamas is not a threat to Israel proper. Today it cannot strike Israeli border communities, cannot fire rockets into Israel, has lost its weapons factories, and can no longer smuggle in arms.
The one card Hamas still holds is the 20 living hostages. It is well aware of Israel’s sensitivity to their fate and the public demand for their immediate release. Hamas exploits this constantly, even publishing images of starved hostages looking like Holocaust survivors.
For a long time, Israel hesitated over whether and how to continue the war in Gaza. Finally, after exhausting negotiations in which Hamas stalled and toyed with both Israel and the United States, Jerusalem prepared to launch an all-out offensive into Gaza City. President Trump himself encouraged this, having also grown weary of Hamas’s stalling, which was clearly only meant to buy time – perhaps hoping for early elections in Israel or a weakening of Trump after the congressional elections. But as in the past, as soon as Israeli military pressure increased, Hamas shifted its position, and this change sharpened the dilemma.
And so, just as Israel’s cabinet and the IDF announced plans for the Gaza City offensive, Hamas suddenly declared it was prepared to accept a 60-day ceasefire. Under the offer, Hamas would return 10 living hostages and the bodies of 18 murdered ones. In return, Israel would withdraw from large parts of the Strip, release numerous terrorists (including murderers), and spend 60 days negotiating a permanent agreement to end the war.
So, what is the dilemma now? Why has Israel not immediately accepted Hamas’s offer, which only months ago was floated by the US envoy and agreed to by Israel? It seems we need to step back and clarify the picture.
The Israeli government says it is determined to eliminate Hamas both as a military power and as Gaza’s ruler. That is why the government rejects calls from hostage families and some former security officials to surrender to Hamas’s terms: the release of all hostages in exchange for a full IDF withdrawal from Gaza and a US-Israeli pledge never to strike Hamas again.
Those who advocate accepting Hamas’s offer argue that Israel could resume fighting later, when the opportunity arises. But none can explain how, if Hamas is clever enough to avoid attacking Israel until it may consider itself ready again – thereby buying itself years to rebuild and rearm unchallenged.
Why is it so crucial to reduce Hamas to total irrelevance in Gaza, given that it has already been badly damaged? Because if Israel withdrew now, Hamas would consolidate power, rebuild its military capacity, and eventually feel strong enough to strike Israel again – first in the Gaza border region, later further afield. Moreover, Hamas would be perceived as the victor of the war, despite the devastation it caused its own people. This would have its own dangerous consequences.
The planned recognition of a Palestinian state by some Western governments has already boosted Hamas’s standing among Palestinians, casting it as the leaders whose atrocities on October 7 delivered statehood. It also threatens regional regimes and destabilises the Middle East, setting a dangerous precedent that terrorism brings results. The sheer irresponsibility of Western governments recognising Palestine after October 7, however, merits an article of its own.
From the local Palestinian point of view it should be emphasised that no serious country would invest in Gaza’s reconstruction while Hamas rules it, and Israel would likely block pro-Hamas states like Turkey or Qatar from doing so. Thus, a withdrawal leaving Hamas in power would condemn Gazans to miserable lives under a ruined land and cruel terrorist rulers.
Israel has, meanwhile, publicly set conditions for ending the war: Hamas’s disarmament, the demilitarisation of Gaza, the exile of its remaining leadership, and the installation of a third-party (not the Palestinian Authority) to manage Gaza’s civilian life and reconstruction. Crucially, Israel insists on retaining security authority, meaning IDF operations against terrorists would be permitted even after a withdrawal, similar to how Israel operates in the West Bank. The IDF would also establish a security perimeter inside Gaza to prevent infiltration to the border’s fence. If Hamas were to accept these terms, the war would end and Israel would withdraw.
But realistically, even after months of negotiations, Hamas is very unlikely to agree to such terms. Thus, if Israel agreed to the phased hostage Hamas now offered, by November, at the end of the 60 days of talks, Jerusalem would find itself facing an excruciating choice: launch a months-long war to conquer Gaza City and the central camps, or abandon its conditions and allow Hamas to retain control of the Gaza Strip.
The pressure inside Israel to fight will be enormous, but it will face an even louder and stronger anti-Israel coalition worldwide. Worse, Hamas would use the 60 days to prepare defences, plant explosives, and fortify its positions, and the IDF would need to retake ground it had already vacated. Any resumed war would then cost the IDF far more casualties.
At the heart of the dilemma is thus the fate of the hostages: should Israel agree to a partial deal now, rescuing half of them but leaving 10 in Hamas’s hands, and then fight later under far worse conditions? Or is it wiser to fight now – when military and diplomatic conditions are more favourable – but with double the number of hostages still held by Hamas, whose lives would be in grave danger?
Some argue that once Israel enters a ceasefire process, it may never be able to resume fighting – due to external pressures (Washington’s policy shifts, European sanctions) or internal ones (government collapse, elections). According to this view, Israel must fight now while it has strong U.S. backing, or risk losing its last chance to destroy Hamas.
Others claim that if Israel does accept a ceasefire, and Hamas then refuses its terms, Israel will regain international legitimacy for a renewed offensive, having proven its willingness to compromise. But this is wishful thinking. Experience shows that Israel’s “goodwill” is met with cynicism, especially in Europe. Even US support may not survive another two years of grinding war, no matter how Israel justifies it. This question must be raised directly with US officials, to clarify where they would stand if Israel chose the ceasefire path.
In short: on the long and difficult road to freeing Gaza from Hamas, dismantling its military, and rescuing the hostages, Israel now faces two options:
Delay war to secure the release of half the hostages now, but fight later under far harsher conditions, or perhaps lose the chance to fight altogether.
Fight now, under more favourable military and diplomatic conditions, but at the probable cost of more hostages’ lives.
Maj. Gen. Yaakov Amidror (Rer.), who served in the IDF for 36 years, is a former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister and Head of the National Security Council. He is currently a fellow at JINSA in Washington DC and at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security
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