There is a contradiction at the heart of next week’s election in Israel.
It is, for sure, an election about Benjamin Netanyahu – about his past record and, even more, about where Israel would be be heading were he to remain as prime minister.
But those questions have very different meanings inside and outside Israel.
Outside – for almost the entire rest of the world – the issue of Netanyahu is the issue of the Gaza war, with the prime minister having become a canvas on which Israel-haters draw whatever they wish.
Accusations of genocide and war crimes are directed at Israel generally, but specifically they are thrown at Netanyahu as the exemplification of everything the Israel-haters allege.
In as much as they care about the election, the perception outside Is that it is test to see if Israelis generally are the monsters they allege, or if they have the basic decency to eject him.
I’ve spent the past week in Israel and it’s clear that the Bibi question inside Israel is very different.
For one thing, although there is a debate about the tactics and strategy of the Gaza war, there is no significant debate about the idea of it. Both left and right understand that. Of course they do: Israel itself was traumatised on October 7 – every part of it.
The idea that the Gaza war was an optional fight is not merely a luxury belief held only by those who have never had to fight to exist.
It’s a decadent view by those who want Israel – and Jews – wiped out.
There are of course huge debates about October 7 and its aftermath – not least how it could have happened, and Netanyahu’s refusal to permit a proper state inquiry.
Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett, Avigdor Lieberman – anyone with even a faint hope of succeeding Bibi has made setting up such an inquiry their first promise.
But the real Bibi question inside Israel isn’t about Gaza, it’s about Israel.
Until the 7 October massacre, it was not uncommon to hear sane, sensible people talk of civil war, with the protests over the proposed judicial reforms symbolising the raging debate over the future direction of the country.
Israel came together after 7 October, but those divisions have not gone away.
Quite the opposite: the damage, both internal and external of having a government including monsters such as Smotrich and Ben-Gvir has deepened.
Take crime – one of the biggest issues of the election, but which is barely mentioned outside Israel.
In his brief time as PM, Bennett made serious strides in tackling crime in Arab areas, with special task forces having a real impact.
Under Netanyahu, those task forces have been dismantled. Not because Netanyahu has any particular desire to see crime rise again in Arab areas but because the minister in charge is Ben-Gvir, who has been effectively left to his own devices over this, and who welcomes Arab crime as grist to his racist mill.
But one consequence of this is an expectation that the Arab vote, which has been declining in recent elections, to 54 per cent turnout in 2021 (as against 67 per cent overall voter turnout and 73 per cent without the Arab vote included), may increase significantly.
That could have the double-effect of not only giving the Arab list more seats, but correspondingly reducing the number of seats held by the far-right, and thus their influence on coalition building.
The taboo which Netanyahu broke when he included the far-right in his coalition has gone forever.
But it has strange consequences. One common theme I heard from left voters is the belief that Netanyahu will somehow find a way to cobble a government together, and that since that is a likely outcome the main focus needs to be on ensuring that a Bibi government is merely right wing, rather than far-right.
Thus the phenomenon of left-wing voters who will vote for Netanyahu, specifically so he has no need of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. (This might help explain why Eisenkot’s bloc has failed to make the leap in the polls that many expected, along with the perception that it is only in the last week or two that he has started to campaign with vim and vigour.)
As one put it to me, Israel is now a right-wing country - what matters is that its government is sensible right, not far-right.
One of the most striking dichotomies of the election is that it is widely seen as marking a turning point for Israel’s future direction – but any visitor to the country will be struck above all by the astonishing vitality and energy of Israelis, even by their own standards.
There is a barely a road, a street or a highway that doesn’t have building works – despite the great strain on the labour force since October 7.
The Bank of Israel reported that financing for residential construction rose by 40 per cent in 2025; industrial construction is now back at the (record) levels of 2023.
Overall growth is forecast to rise by 5.6 per cent in 2026, which is quite something given the costs – financial and human – of the war.
Next week Israel will make one of the most significant choices in its lifetime. The only prediction I will make is that almost none of the coverage outside Israel will reflect either the choice Israelis actually make, or what it means.
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