We need to disrupt more effectively its financial structures, both those across the continent as well as those located in the territory of our NATO ally Turkey
December 10, 2025 14:45
For far too long, European governments have comforted themselves with the assumption that Hamas terror attacks would remain confined towards targets in Israel and the Palestinian territories. The prevailing belief was that in Europe the group would concentrate on generating finances and building up political influence through catering towards its sympathisers.
European authorities were always clear about the general terrorist nature of Hamas. After all, the group’s Izz al-Din al-Qassem (IDQ) brigades was added to the EU Terrorist List in 2001, the year the list was created. The entire organisation was listed by the EU in 2003. The UK proscribed IDQ in 2001, but it took until 2021 for the British government to proscribe the entirety of Hamas. Nevertheless, the hope was that Europe may be spared from direct terror attacks by Hamas.
This illusion was shattered already back in December 2023. Through several arrests in Berlin and Rotterdam, German and Dutch authorities say they disrupted what prosecutors allege was a cell linked to Hamas. The German federal prosecutor has accused the suspects of operating not as mere sympathisers but as trained individuals allegedly deployed to Europe by Hamas several years earlier. According to the indictment, the group is said to have received instructions from Hamas handlers in spring 2023 to locate and clear arms depots in eastern Europe and to prepare for potential attacks in Germany.
If proven, these allegations would indicate that months before October 7, 2023, Hamas was already seeking to internationalise its violence. Prosecutors also contend that this alleged cell was not a standalone structure.
The terrorists had failed to locate the arms caches prior to their arrest, indicating that these had been placed by other Hamas operatives. This pointed to additional Hamas operational networks in Europe. The recent arrests in Germany in October and in the UK as well as the Czech Republic in November have sadly confirmed this suspicion. Once again, Hamas tried to organise terror attacks in Germany and Europe, using both professional operators as well as hardline sympathisers.
As far as its ideology is concerned, it should not come as a surprise that Hamas has been preparing for terror attacks outside Israel. After all, Hamas had been established as the Palestinian arm of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Its founding document, the infamous Hamas Charter of 1988, made this very clear. Hamas has never distanced itself from these roots, including not in its political document published in 2017. The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood is not confined to one geographical area, but its Islamist extremist ideas are global in nature. Hence, it is not surprising that Hamas would be willing to also extend its operations beyond Israel and the Palestinian territories.
Given what we have learnt over the past two years, we must become more vigilant not only about Hamas as a regional terror organisation but as a clear and present terrorism threat inside Europe. This will mean that we need to not only monitor more closely and disrupt more effectively its online propaganda activities but also disrupt more diligently its financial structures. It is not acceptable that an EU and UK listed terror organisation, such as Hamas, can transmit its vile and antisemitic propaganda virtually unhindered via social media onto the screens of Europeans. Those platforms that allow this must be held accountable. Given the large number of successful and prevented terror attacks in Europe over recent years, we should take this as an opportunity to rethink the responsibility we assign to tech giants for the content on their platforms. These commercial entities must be legally required to proactively cooperate with European security authorities. Allowing them to wait for official request, as is the case now, is no longer a responsible way to counter the misuse of these platforms by Hamas and other terror groups.
We also need to disrupt more effectively the financial structures of Hamas, both those that extend into Europe as well as those located in the territory of our Nato ally Turkey. Here at home, more emphasis must be put on disrupting Hamas’s donation drives. These are conducted clandestinely via sham charities offline and openly online. This will also involve getting better at disrupting cryptocurrency donation streams. Hamas was not only one of the first but is also one of the most technically innovative terror groups in misusing cryptocurrencies. Much of Hamas’s financial management structures concentrate in Turkey. This puts the Turkish government into a unique position to pressure Hamas to finally agree to relinquish its weapons and leave the Gaza Strip. It is time that the Turkish government does so.
If we in Europe and the international community, particularly Turkey, allow Hamas’s financial and online communication systems to continue to function without disruption, we will be forced to mitigate a much more serious terrorism threat from this group. Sadly, as the arrests since December 2023 have demonstrated, this also means a much higher risk of Hamas terror attacks in Europe. Hamas’s money and social media accounts should not be left alone. It is in our vital security interest to ensure that they will not.
Dr. Hans Jakob Schindler, Senior Director, Counter Extremism Project (CEP), Auschwitz Research Center on Hate, Extremism and Radicalization (ARCHER)
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