Israel’s foreign relations have rarely been shaped by sentiment alone. Geography, timing and common threats have usually mattered far more.
In the 1950s, Israel developed the “Alliance of the Periphery”, drawing the Jewish state closer to non-Arab powers including Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia. Surrounded by hostile Arab states, Israel sought strategic depth among countries that also feared the prevailing tide of Arab nationalism.
Seven decades later, the Abraham Accords applied similar logic in a transformed region. The agreements were rightly celebrated as a diplomatic breakthrough, but they were not produced by goodwill alone. Israel and several Arab states recognised that they faced overlapping dangers, above all from Iran, and possessed complementary economic, technological and security interests.
Today, while attention remains fixed on whether more Arab countries will join the Abraham Accords, or whether existing signatories might retreat from them, another strategic alignment is taking shape. Israel’s deepening partnership with Greece and Cyprus, sometimes described as an Eastern Mediterranean axis, could have profound consequences for Israel’s security, energy resilience and place in the region.
Its rise is particularly striking because it was anything but inevitable.
For decades after Israel’s Independence, Greece supported the Palestinians and maintained close relations with the PLO, only establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1990.
Cyprus, meanwhile, watched Israel’s once-close partnership with Turkey with understandable unease. Neither country appeared a natural strategic partner for Jerusalem.
What changed was the regional map.
Under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his AK Party, Turkey moved steadily away from Israel. Greece, already seeking greater deterrence against Ankara, found in Israel a capable defence partner.
Improving relations between Athens and Washington helped reinforce that realignment. Cyprus saw a similar opportunity as Turkish policy became more assertive in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Then came natural gas. The discovery and development of offshore fields created not only commercial possibilities but a new strategic geography linking Israel, Cyprus and Greece.
In 2013, the three signed a tripartite energy memorandum. Their cooperation has since expanded into electricity connectivity, emergency planning, technology, tourism and diplomacy.
The most ambitious symbol is the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI), a proposed subsea electricity cable intended ultimately to connect Israel and Cyprus with Greece and the wider European grid.
The project has suffered delays, political disputes and questions over financing. Yet the European Commission continues to support it. If completed, it would end Cyprus’s energy isolation, give Israel a physical energy bridge to Europe and create infrastructure whose strategic value extends well beyond the electricity it carries.
Defence cooperation is moving even faster.
At their tenth trilateral summit in Jerusalem last December, the three governments pledged to reinforce cooperation on security, defence, maritime affairs and counterterrorism. Days later, military officials signed a joint action plan for 2026, providing for expanded air and naval exercises and closer operational cooperation.
On 31 August, Israel and Greece signed a €3 billion agreement under which Israeli systems will form the core of Greece’s multi-layered “Achilles Shield”. David’s Sling, SPYDER and Barak MX systems, radars and command-and-control capabilities will help defend Greece against missiles, aircraft and drones. It is the largest defence agreement ever signed between the two countries, accompanied by another deal for counter-drone systems and extensive participation by Greek industry.
Is this, as some have suggested, a Mediterranean NATO in the making? Not yet.
There is no mutual-defence clause, integrated command or treaty obliging one country to fight for another. Inflating the relationship into something it is not risks obscuring what it has already become: an increasingly institutionalised strategic partnership, supported by shared exercises, interoperable technology, major arms agreements, infrastructure and regular political coordination.
Turkey is plainly part of the calculation. Greece and Cyprus have longstanding disputes with Ankara over territory, maritime boundaries and energy rights.
Israel confronts a Turkish government that hosts Hamas leaders, deploys increasingly antagonistic rhetoric and seeks wider regional influence. The three countries need not define their partnership as anti-Turkish, nor should they close the door to improved relations with Ankara.
Nevertheless, prudent states prepare for intentions to change and capabilities to remain.
More importantly, this partnership is not based only on a common concern. Israel, Greece and Cyprus are democratic, broadly like-minded states occupying a strategically vital corridor between Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.
Each offers something the others need: Israel brings military technology, intelligence and innovation; Greece offers strategic depth and an entry point into Europe; Cyprus provides geography, connectivity and a natural platform for regional cooperation.
For Israel, the lesson extends beyond the Eastern Mediterranean. The Abraham Accords remain essential and should be expanded. However, Israeli diplomacy must not be measured solely by relations with Arab neighbours. The coming decades will demand overlapping networks built around geography, capabilities and shared interests, from the Mediterranean to Europe, Africa and India.
Israel’s best alliances have often begun not with grand declarations but with a sober recognition of reality. The Eastern Mediterranean partnership follows that tradition. Jerusalem should invest in it, deepen it and use it as a model.
In a volatile region, with constantly shifting sands, Israel needs not one diplomatic breakthrough, but many durable circles of cooperation.
Ashley Perry is a former senior Israeli government adviser who has worked with eight cabinet ministers, was a former advisor to the Negev Forum, and has been involved in Israeli politics and every election campaign for the past two decades
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