Iran may use radioactive ‘dirty bomb’ against Israel if regime survival in doubt, warn Tehran sources

Tehran University professor Hamzeh Safavi is the son of Yahya Rahim Safavi, a senior military adviser to the late Supreme Leader.

While he does not have official status in the Islamic Republic, the son is seen as a reliable source of the position of the regime.

Alluding to the possibility of Iran using radioactive material in a “dirty bomb”, he raised the question of whether its holdings of enriched uranium were necessarily limited to its declared stockpile.

He said: “Who can guarantee that the Islamic Republic has only this amount of enriched uranium?

“Iran is a vast country, and the global market for unaccounted-for uranium is also substantial, with no real accounting for it.”

Safavi went on to say: “If things descend into dirty tactics, officials of the Islamic Republic have countermeasures in place so that, if the Islamic Republic is not to survive, Israel will not survive either.

“There are all kinds of dirty bombs that do not require the sophisticated technology of a nuclear bomb and can produce the same result.”

While his comments do not establish that Iran possesses a dirty bomb or has made an operational decision to construct or use one, discussion of such a possibility by the son of a senior figure will add to concern that the regime is becoming more extreme.

Mohammad Reza Naqdi, a senior adviser to the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), said in a television appearance that the terror militia had been instructed to develop the ability to conduct operations far beyond Iran’s borders.

“We must be able to extend our operations onto enemy soil, into enemy territories, and carry out operations far from our own territory,” Naqdi said.

“At present, the IRGC has been tasked with developing this capability so that it can carry out such operations when the appropriate time comes.”

Naqdi did not identify the “enemy” whose territory he was referring to, but Iranian officials routinely use the term for both Israel and the US.

The statements followed a series of orders issued on August 10 in the name of the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, who succeeded his father, restructuring parts of Iran’s military establishment and appointing six commanders to sensitive positions.

Khamenei remains absent from public view, making it impossible to establish independently whether the decisions were personally made by him or by other figures within the regime and subsequently issued in his name. There is still no definitive public evidence establishing that he is personally directing the affairs of the Islamic Republic.

The uncertainty reflects the extraordinary opacity that has surrounded decision-making in Tehran since the 40-day war earlier this year. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has emerged as one of the regime’s most visible surviving political figures and has been treated by US President Donald Trump as a potential negotiating mainstay.

But it remains unclear whether Ghalibaf, senior intelligence officials or other members of the security establishment are exercising greater power behind the scenes while preserving the appearance of authority under Mojtaba Khamenei.

One of the August 10 orders effectively placed the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbia Central Headquarters and the Armed Forces General Staff under a single commander, Ali Abdollahi, a veteran Revolutionary Guard officer.

Since 2016, Khatam al-Anbia has been responsible for planning and directing joint military operations during wartime, while the General Staff has concentrated on strategy, coordination and military preparedness. Putting both under one commander consolidates functions that had previously been divided.

Abdollahi emerged as a prominent public figure during the 40-day war, repeatedly threatening Israel and the US and playing a senior role in overseeing missile operations and Iran’s attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz.

The leadership reshuffle is at least in part simply a practical necessity, after many of Iran’s most senior commanders were killed by the US and Israel earlier this year.

Ahmad Vahidi, who had already been leading the IRGC after its previous commander and several senior deputies were killed, has now been formally appointed commander of the Revolutionary Guards and promoted to major general. His elevation appears to formalise an arrangement that was already in place rather than represent an entirely new direction.

Potentially more significant is the return of cleric Hossein Taeb, who has been appointed commander of the Basij paramilitary force.

Taeb headed the IRGC intelligence organisation for years before Ali Khamenei removed him in 2022 following a succession of Israeli intelligence operations inside Iran. His return places a veteran of the regime’s intelligence and internal-security apparatus back near the centre of its coercive machinery.

Several sensitive positions remain unfilled. Neither of the IRGC’s two principal intelligence bodies has had a permanent leader since Major General Majid Khademi, who headed both the IRGC intelligence organisation and its Intelligence Protection Organisation, was killed in an April 6 strike in Tehran.

The two organisations perform distinct but complementary roles. The Intelligence Organisation focuses heavily on political and security operations, including domestic repression, while the Intelligence Protection Organisation is responsible for counterintelligence, personnel loyalty and preventing infiltration.

Permanent successors have also not been announced for the police intelligence chief killed at the beginning of the war or for the Armed Forces General Staff’s intelligence and operations deputies, who were killed in Israeli strikes during the war.