Israel’s fallen hero who fought to restore his reputation after he assessed that Egypt and Syria would not attack before the Yom Kippur War
December 22, 2025 11:00
He was the director of Israel’s military intelligence (Aman) during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and as a man of this power he held the strategy of the country’s downfall or salvation in his hands. But sadly, he made the wrong decision. His pre-war assessment that Egypt and Syria would not attack Israel, despite many tip-offs, and all the intelligence analysis pointing in the opposite direction, became his legacy.
Eli Zeira, one of the most controversial figures in Israel’s military history, who has died aged 97, was found by the post-war Agranat Commission to have been negligent in his duty. He resigned as a result.
It all began in September,1973 when Israeli PM Golda Meir secretly met Jordan’s King Hussein in Tel Aviv. He told her that Egypt and Syria, mortified by losing the Six Day War of 1967, were preparing to attack Israel. Meir immediately consulted her leading officials, including Zeira, whose advice she implicitly trusted.
Five months earlier Zeira had poured scorn on a similar warning given to Mossad by the Egyptian spy, Ashraf Marwan, whom he believed to be a double agent planting disinformation. Zeira was convinced that Egypt lacked the air superiority to attack Israel, and Syria was unlikely to act alone.
He explained: “A logical analysis of the situation will show that the Egyptians would make a mistake if they went to war.” Thus he dismissed the Jordanian king’s warning out of hand, assessing the chance of an attack as “lower than low”. And this even after Egypt’s so-called major military exercise along the Suez Canal on October 1 that year.
Steadfast in his convictions, Zeira refused to mobilise Israel’s reservists, the bedrock of the country’s defence forces, and considered it too risky to activate listening devices planted on Egyptian communication lines. He rejected every warning about the imminence of war. He succinctly told a colleague: “It is military intelligence’s job to safeguard the nation’s nerves, not to drive the public crazy, not to undermine the economy.”
But on the night of October 5, 1973 the Egyptian source secretly met Mossad chief Zvi Zamir in London and informed him Egypt and Syria would invade Israel at sunset the following day, which happened to be the eve of Yom Kippur. Zamir woke Meir and her officials in the small hours of the following day. Zeira conceded at that point – but it was far too late. This time it was Israel which was unprepared and caught off guard with few troops along the border. The combined might of Egypt and Syria overcame Israel’s woefully inadequate defences.
American tanks and artillery airlifted to Israel helped bring the war to an end with a ceasefire 19 days later but it cost the lives of more than 2,500 Israeli soldiers. That, plus the fact that it had been caused by an unprecedented intelligence failure – something the young state had not incurred before.
It triggered a government commission of inquiry under Shimon Agranat, Supreme Court Chief Justice. In its findings the commission acknowledged Zeira as “an officer of outstanding intellectual ability, enjoying great authority over his subordinates and highly regarded by his superiors” but laid the blame squarely at his door, as the one primarily responsible for the intelligence failure.
The commission found Zeira tended to take unqualified decisions based on “great self-confidence and readiness to act as final arbiter in intelligence matters”. While not actually calling for his dismissal from the IDF, it concluded that these serious failures made his role as director of military intelligence basically untenable.
Zeira was 47 at the time of his unwilling resignation from military service, and although in later life he acknowledged his failure to heed warnings as “my life’s biggest mistake,” he felt scapegoated, blaming Mossad and Zamir for failing in their duties. He was uncompromisingly bitter about this in his 1993 autobiography, The October 1973 War: Myth Versus Reality, stating that “the entire blame was placed on those in uniform and the political leadership came out clean”.
Zamir also accused Zeira of leaking the identity of Egyptian billionaire and Mossad informant, Ashraf Marwan, who was identified in 2002 by the Israeli-British historian, Ahron Bregman as a son-in-law of former Egyptian president Gamel Abdel Nasser and a senior adviser to his successor, Anwar Sadat, who actually ordered the 1973 attack on Israel. Zeira challenged Zamir’s allegation by filing a libel lawsuit against him. The process went so far as a criminal investigation by the State Prosecutor’s Office into Zeira, which concluded that Zeira had leaked Marwan’s identity, but no charges were pressed on account of his long service and advancing years.
As for Marwan himself, in 2007 he was found dead in the rose garden beneath his fifth floor London flat at 24, Carlton Terrace – it was never discovered whether he had jumped or been pushed. This was yet another black mark against Zeira, as he was then blamed for Marwan’s death by leaking his identity to Bregman.
With tragic significance, Zeira’s failure to heed warnings about attacks was replicated 50 years later in the massacre by Hamas of Israeli civilians on October 7, 2023, when again vital intelligence was ignored.
Born in Haifa in 1928, the son of Polish parents who had emigrated to Mandatory Palestine before the Second World War, Zeira’s father was an electrical engineer and his mother, a housekeeper. He was educated at the Hebrew Reali School, a leading private school. A teacher noted his talents in chemistry and arranged a Cambridge scholarship, but instead, at the age of 18, Zeira opted to join the Yiftach Brigade of the Palmach in 1946. He proved a distinguished platoon and company commander during the War of Independence, battling the Arab Legion at Latrun and the Egyptian army in the Negev. He was especially noted for having repelled a sustained Arab attack on Kibbutz Tirat Zvi.
With the military life clearly in his blood, between 1949 and 1950 Zeira’s star was clearly on the ascendant. He led the Southern Command’s squad leaders’ school and became the first officer from the newly formed IDF to attend a US army company commanders’ course in America, where he learned to fly. He headed the office of Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan in 1954-55 and then commanded the former Givati Brigade’s 51st Battalion. He married his childhood friend, Ester (Etika) in 1951 and they had three daughters. He graduated in economics and statistics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, later rejoining the IDF and serving in high-ranking roles in planning, heading the Chief of Staff’s office during the 1956 Suez crisis.
He left Israel for a while, first to America for another army course, and later to advise the Ethiopian army. He then joined the Military Intelligence Directorate in 1963, focusing on technologies developing long-range intelligence gathering in Egypt and Syria, which helped Israel win the Six Day War. He was commended for this victory by the Israel Defence Prize Committee. He was also appointed Israel’s military attaché to the US and Canada in 1970 and was promoted to the rank of major general. On October 1, 1972 he was appointed IDF Intelligence Chief. He had barely completed his first year as director of military intelligence before the outbreak of the 1973 War.
Zeira’s glory days were over after his resignation. He had spent the years 1946 to 1974 in military service, and then went on to study at California’s Stanford University for a year before achieving success as a businessman. But he continued to fight to clear his name.
His wife, Ester predeceased him. He is survived by his daughters.
Major General Eli Zeira; born April 4, 1928. Died November 21, 2025
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