A British academic at a university with ties to the Ministry of Defence sharing apparently sensitive aviation research with an Iranian university is far from being a “one-off”.

The way in which the totalitarian regime of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is exploiting UK universities for military research is much more systematic and organised than anyone in Whitehall might imagine.

And, to make matters even more concerning, the notorious Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — which is yet to be proscribed by the UK government as a terrorist organisation — has its fingerprints all over it.

The IRGC’s role in controlling the regime’s nuclear, ballistic missile and drone programmes is well documented in the West.

What is less known, however, is how the IRGC uses Iranian universities for the procurement of sensitive military research and technology.

Sharif University Avicenna Buildin Credit M samadi

Sharif University (Photo: M Samadi)

The JC recently reported that British universities had collaborated on drone research with two Iranian colleges — namely Sharif University and Shahid Beheshti University — that had been sanctioned by the UK in 2011 for “carrying out scientific research in relation to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities”.

But these two Iranian colleges are just the tip of the iceberg. In 2005, the presidency of IRGC-affiliate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would open the door for the IRGC’s entry to higher education in Iran.

From 2009, it began to use Iran’s top universities for its nefarious research, establishing its “Salman Headquarters” to absorb and mobilise high performing Iranian students.

But the major gearshift would take place in 2021 when, following the recommendation of the IRGC- controlled Iranian Defence Ministry, the “Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution” (SCCR) — the highest authority over educational and cultural affairs — unveiled a key strategic document entitled “The Comprehensive Act on Science and Technology in the Defence and Security field of the Islamic Republic of Iran”.

Iran Centrifuges 2

Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited a uranium enrichment facility in Iran in April 2008 (Photo: Iranian State Media)

This document, in Farsi, is virtually unknown to the West — and yet it is the single most important document outlining how the IRGC and Iranian armed forces is using all Iranian universities (and their international collaborations) to advance its military research and development projects.

In essence, the document, which has been co-signed by the IRGC’s commander-in-chief, is strategic agreement between the IRGC, regular army and Iranian universities for maximum cooperation for the procurement of military research and technologies.

It outlines how the IRGC and other armed elements of the regime are able to make “maximum use of all national academic [and] research capacities” to acquire “soft, semi-soft and hard defence and security sciences and technologies”.

The document even lists the regime’s “main science and technology priorities for defence and security”, including: “Automated and unmanned equipment (drones), aerospace propulsion systems, artificial intelligence, advanced warfare software and military science and technology.”

More importantly, under its “strategies” to procure the above, it calls for “maximum effective collaborations with national and international [university] departments”.
The document has been implemented across all Iranian universities, with deputy defence minister with IRGC commander Seyed Mahdi Farahi saying “80 universities” are directly cooperating with the regime’s defence ministry to develop its defence industry, flagging particular cooperation on “aerospace and quantum technologies”.

Due to the totalitarian nature of the Islamic Republic, all universities in Iran are controlled by regime, with university heads being directly appointed by the SCCR without consultation with the individual colleges.

Ebrahim Raisi GettyImages-1251937784

Ebrahim Raisi (Photo: Getty Images)

And, following the presidency of hardline Islamist cleric Ebrahim Raisi, who chairs the SCCR, there has been a further surge in IRGC-affiliates being appointed as university heads.

Against this backdrop, there should be no doubt that any British “dual use” military research shared with academic institutions in Iran — such as the one reported today — will end up in the hands of the IRGC.

To add insult to injury, such research and technology could even end up being used against the UK, with one of the strategy’s stated objectives being “hostility with enemies in the path of achieving the scientific defence goals of the Islamic Revolution”.

While the British universities caught-up in this latest revelation will attest to “robust” due diligence protocols, clearly existing sanctions are failing to deter sensitive “dual use” research collaborations with Iranian colleges — all of which are being utilised by the IRGC, as per the strategic document.

There is a quick fix to this: proscribing the IRGC as a terrorist organisation.

Proscription would make it absolutely clear that any person or entity that collaborates with the IRGC either directly or via a third party — such as an academic institution — would be committing a terror offence.

This would significantly raise the cost for any UK university or academic to share sensitive military or “dual use” research and technology, making it no different to collaborating with proscribed UK groups such as ISIS, al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, a terror group founded by the IRGC itself.

The IRGC is not a conventional armed force and it operates no differently to these terrorist organisations: from its radicalisation programme that calls for the killing of Jews and the torture of Iranians who oppose the regime, to its modus operandi centred of terrorism, hostage-taking and hijackings.

Today’s revelation is yet another example of why existing sanctions on the IRGC are failing.

This follows a rise in IRGC terror plots, as well as the propagation of IRGC violent Islamist extremist propaganda across schools, mosques and community centres across the UK, another area that is not prohibited under existing sanctions on the Guard.

The government’s failure to proscribe the IRGC as a terrorist organisation puts the UK’s national security and its citizens at direct risk. But it’s not too late to reverse this.

Kasra Aarabi is an expert on Iran and the IRGC