The Jewish Chronicle

An insanity plea may be a crazy option

February 3, 2011 14:10
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords is rushed to hospital after being shot. The gunman is reported to be considering a plea of  insanity

By

Jonathan Goldberg

3 min read

Anthony from Oxford writes: I have been following with keen interest reports about the recent shooting in Arizona of the Jewish Congresswoman, Gabrielle Giffords. She survived the attack in which many other bystanders were killed by a lone gunman. I have read that he is now reportedly planning an insanity defence at trial. What are the limits of such a defence, and would it be open to him equally in the UK?

Anthony, it happens that I was recently in America and witnessed myself the enormous shock and outrage caused by these crimes. The story still features prominently in almost every news bulletin. Gabrielle Giffords was the first Jewish woman ever elected to Congress and despite being born and raised in the somewhat remote state of Arizona, she has proudly proclaimed both her Jewish identity and her support of Israel at every possible opportunity. Many Americans are asking how there can possibly be any defence, when the gunman had carefully stalked her beforehand and had premeditated his crime, according to documents found in his home, and was captured red-handed when on the verge of reloading his pistol to kill others.

The origins of the defence of insanity, in fact, arise from the English common law, and have broadly been adopted in similar terms in the USA and also numerous other common law jurisdictions. Their history is interesting. In 1843 a deranged assassin called Daniel M'Naghten attempted to shoot dead the Prime Minister Robert Peel. He missed Peel, but killed his private secretary. Unusually the House of Lords requested a panel of judges presided over by the Lord Chief Justice to codify guidance for juries whenever a defendant raised the plea of insanity in future. The result has become known as "The M'Naghten Rules".

They apply to any crime, not only to murder. In essence, a defendant who can prove on the balance of probabilities that at the time of committing his crime, he laboured under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing wrong, is entitled to a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity". In this context, not knowing his act was wrong means legally wrong, not morally wrong.

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