Why the Lebanon-Israel deal to disarm Hezbollah is historic

So dominant was the Hezbollah threat that some have argued it contributed to Israel's strategic blind spot before October 7. While military planners concentrated on preventing catastrophe in the north, Hamas was quietly preparing one in the south.

That is why last week's trilateral framework agreement between the United States, Israel and Lebanon deserves far greater attention than it has received. Whatever challenges lie ahead, the agreement represents something potentially historic: the first serious attempt not merely to contain Hezbollah, but to remove Iran from its position as the ultimate power broker inside Lebanon.

To understand its importance, one must understand Lebanon itself.

Lebanon has rarely been a simple nation-state. Its delicate political system divides power among religious communities, each with different interests and, often, different foreign patrons.

For decades, Iran exploited that fragile balance. Through Hezbollah, it built not simply a proxy militia but an alternative state, complete with its own military, intelligence services, welfare system and political influence.

Over more than 40 years, Tehran invested tens of billions of dollars into Hezbollah. It became the crown jewel of Iran's so-called "Axis of Resistance" and arguably the Islamic Republic's greatest strategic success outside its own borders.

Even after suffering significant military setbacks, Iran was never likely to abandon such an investment. Reports have already pointed to renewed efforts to move Revolutionary Guard commanders, weapons and financial assistance into Lebanon in an attempt to rebuild Hezbollah's capabilities. The organisation may be weaker than before, but it is far from defeated.

The danger became even greater following the recent much touted US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding, which many in Israel feared could reinforce Tehran's claim to be Lebanon's protector. If Iran became accepted internationally as the indispensable actor in determining Lebanon's future, Israel's operational freedom against Hezbollah would inevitably narrow.

Jerusalem therefore found itself in a race against time.

Israel has little interest in remaining inside Lebanese territory indefinitely. Its objective has never been occupation for its own sake but ensuring that communities across northern Israel can live without facing another October 7-style threat from an even more heavily armed adversary.

The new framework attempts to change the equation. Rather than allowing Iran to define Lebanon's future, it places responsibility squarely on the sovereign Lebanese state, backed by American diplomacy. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the agreement as sending "a clear message to Iran: you have no foothold in Lebanon, neither you nor Hezbollah."

Whether that ambition becomes reality remains an open question.

Scepticism is entirely justified.

Lebanon has made similar commitments before. Following the Second Lebanon War, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 called for southern Lebanon to be free of armed groups other than the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Twenty years later, up until recently, Hezbollah remained entrenched south of the Litani River, openly violating those commitments while the international community largely looked away.

The true test will not be diplomatic ceremonies in Washington but developments on the ground.

Will the Lebanese Armed Forces genuinely prevent Hezbollah from returning to areas vacated by the Israel Defense Forces? Will Beirut finally assert that decisions about war and peace belong to the Lebanese state rather than an Iranian-backed militia? And perhaps most importantly, will the United States remain committed if Hezbollah attempts to undermine the agreement through intimidation or violence?

Early signs hardly inspire confidence. Hezbollah has already denounced the agreement, rejected any linkage between Israeli withdrawals and its disarmament, and vowed to resist its implementation.

Yet something fundamental has nevertheless changed.

For years, Hezbollah successfully portrayed itself as Lebanon.

Criticism of Hezbollah was presented as criticism of the Lebanese nation itself. This agreement begins to separate those identities. It frames Hezbollah not as Lebanon's defender but as the principal obstacle preventing Lebanon from reclaiming its sovereignty, rebuilding its economy and escaping decades of regional conflict.

That distinction matters.

For the first time in many years, Israel, Lebanon and the United States are publicly aligned on a common strategic objective: strengthening the Lebanese state while reducing Iranian influence.

Success is far from guaranteed. Hezbollah retains enormous political influence, substantial military capabilities and unwavering Iranian support. No agreement alone can erase four decades of entrenchment.

However, history often turns not on dramatic military victories but on moments when political realities begin to shift.

If this framework ultimately succeeds in restoring Lebanese sovereignty and preventing Hezbollah's military resurgence, Israelis may one day look back on it as the moment the country's most dangerous "near enemy" began its long decline.

After years of living under the shadow of Hezbollah's missiles and invasion plans, that possibility alone is worth taking seriously.

Ashley Perry is a former senior Israeli government adviser who has worked with eight cabinet ministers, was a former advisor to the Negev Forum, and has been involved in Israeli politics and every election campaign for the past two decades