Towards the end of 2008, in the final months of George W. Bush’s presidency, Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert flew to Washington with a blunt request: strike Iran before leaving office and prevent it from continuing down the path toward nuclear capability.
Bush did not dismiss the idea outright. He weighed it carefully, aware of both the risks and the potential strategic upside. But with American forces already deeply entrenched in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with a presidency coming to an end, he ultimately chose not to open a third front in the Middle East. Iran, once again, was given time – time to continue advancing its nuclear programme and expanding its ballistic missile capabilities.
This piece of history is worth keeping in mind today, as a point of contrast that helps explain what is unfolding right now in Iran.
Because the key difference between then and now is not only about military capability, intelligence penetration, or operational reach. It is about time – and more specifically, about how much of it President Donald Trump has left in office.
In 2008, Bush was a lame-duck president, with only months remaining in his term. Any decision to strike Iran would have had to stand entirely on its own, without the ability to follow up if the initial operation fell short. A partial success or failure would simply have been handed over to his successor, with all of the uncertainty and risk that it carried.
Today, the situation is fundamentally different.
When Israel launched its campaign against Iran in June 2025 during what became known as the 12-day war, it carried most of the operational burden, sending its air force 2,000 kilometres to strike nuclear facilities, missile bases, and critical elements of Iran’s military infrastructure. The United States played an important but what is best defined as a supporting role, deploying B-2 bombers to hit the hardened nuclear sites of Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow.
But what began then has since evolved into something far more significant. Operation Roaring Lion, as it is known in Israel, and Operation Epic Fury, as it is called in Washington, are unfolding under a president who is not approaching the end of his tenure, but rather still at the beginning of it.
Donald Trump has nearly three years remaining in office, and that fact alone impacts the calculus in Tehran in ways that should not be underestimated.
Because even if the regime manages to survive the current war and begins, as it inevitably will, to rebuild its capabilities over the coming months and years, it will be doing so under the shadow of a president who has time and determination to act again. Trump understands that this will be his legacy and therefore will not want to leave office in 2029 with Iran back on track.
This reality – known to the Iranians – creates a strategic window during which the regime will need consider not only how to survive the current conflict, but how to operate in a reality in which renewed military action remains an ongoing possibility for years to come. That is fundamentally different than Bush in 2008.
And yet, there remains a critical ambiguity at the heart of the current war. While the campaign itself has been remarkably effective, the question of its ultimate objective remains unclear.
At the outset, the rhetoric coming from both Washington and Jerusalem suggested the weakening and eventual toppling of the regime. There was open discussion of empowering internal dissent and creating conditions that could make it harder for the regime to maintain its grip on power.
But over time, that messaging has shifted. What we are hearing now from Washington, from Jerusalem, and from military officials is something more limited – a focus on degrading Iran’s capabilities, on setting back its nuclear programme, on weakening its missile arsenal, and on reducing its ability to project power across the region.
At the same time, the conversation in Europe and even within parts of the American policy establishment has moved in yet another direction, placing growing emphasis on the stability of global energy markets and the need to ensure the continued flow of oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz.
These are not simply different emphases. They point to fundamentally different objectives.
If the goal is regime change, then this is the beginning of a long and potentially unpredictable campaign, one that would require sustained pressure and a willingness to accept prolonged attacks.
If the goal is more limited – to degrade Iran’s capabilities, to delay its nuclear ambitions, and to re-establish deterrence – then it is entirely possible that much of that objective has already been achieved, or is well within reach.
And if the goal is narrower still – to secure maritime routes and stabilise energy flows – then success could be declared within a relatively short period of time.
The challenge is not choosing between these options. And without that clarity, it becomes exceedingly difficult to assess whether the current strategy is working, because the benchmark for success remains undefined.
Nevertheless, and even as sirens continue to sound and missiles still fall across Israel and parts of the Gulf, it is essential to step back and look at the broader picture.
Because from a purely military perspective, what has been achieved over the past weeks is nothing short of extraordinary.
Israel has managed to establish air superiority over a country nearly 2,000 kilometres away, with its air force operating over Tehran with a level of freedom that would have been difficult to imagine not long ago.
Iran’s senior military leadership has been systematically targeted and degraded, while key components of its defense-industrial base have been struck – not only the missile launchers themselves, but the factories, supply chains, and infrastructure that sustain them.
Facilities tied to uranium enrichment, including centrifuge production sites, have been hit. Locations connected to weapons testing have been targeted. Sensitive and often secretive elements of Iran’s nuclear programme have been exposed and struck.
And in the most recent phase of the campaign, Israel, together with the United States, has begun to focus on the regime’s internal repression apparatus, targeting the tools used by the Basij and the IRGC to suppress dissent and crush protest movements.
The logic behind this is clear: if the Iranian people rise again, the regime should find it more difficult to contain them.
But even here, a degree of realism is required. If the regime survives, Iran will attempt to rebuild and will try to restore its missile capabilities. What is in question is how long that process will take because for the first time in decades, the balance has shifted in a meaningful way.
The deterrence of Israel and the United States has been established – in both June and now – in a way that, until recently, seemed almost inconceivable.
That does not yet constitute a full strategy. But it does constitute a new reality.
Yaakov Katz is a co-founder of the MEAD policy forum, a senior fellow at JPPI, and a former editor-in-chief of the Jerusalem Post. His newest book is While Israel Slept
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