Is the collapse of the Islamic regime in Iran achievable? That is the key question amid the joint US-Israeli military operation. The answer is yes – but it will require a comprehensive campaign. We are not talking about days; it will take longer.
This is because in order to achieve regime change in Iran the extensive domestic suppressive apparatus of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – the ideological guardians of the mullahs – must be dismantled. And the mullahs have invested a huge amount of resources, time and energy into developing this brutal machinery. It was this IRGC machinery that murdered as many as 40,000 unarmed Iranian civilians during 12 days of protests in Iran.
Remarkably, until recently there was literally no detail on this domestic suppressive apparatus in the public domain. But last month, during the peak of unrest in Iran, my colleague Dr Saeid Golkar and I published a report, which, for the first time, exposed its extensive hidden infrastructure, headquarters, battalions, capabilities and operational methods.
The research was informed by primary documents acquired from within the IRGC’s Tharallah Headquarters – the most critical cog in the regime’s suppressive apparatus, revealing details that had only previously been available to the intelligence services. It exposed how the IRGC had developed a hidden suppressive infrastructure that pervades every layer of the provincial geographical layout in Iran: from the macro level right down to individual neighbourhoods.
The sheer scale of this machinery reveals why regime change will take time.
The IRGC commands 11 supreme security-military headquarters across Iran’s 31 provinces. Each of these security-military headquarters oversees roughly three provinces. When a critical state of emergency is declared – indicating regime change as imminent – these supreme security-military headquarters acquire a mandate to seize full authority over their respective provinces. This brings all state bodies, such as local government, and organisations, including banks, under their control. This took place just a month ago during nationwide protests in Iran.
Beyond these 11 supreme security-military headquarters, as part of its efforts to decentralise its command structure to strengthen its defences during times of war or unrest, the IRGC has established its own provincial guard in every single Iranian province. These provincial guards effectively serve as military commanders for their respective provinces, overseeing all IRGC and Basij militia bases within their areas.
The most important supreme security-military headquarter is the one in the Iranian capital: the Tharallah Headquarters. This is because all of Iran’s revolutions have been city-led revolutions. As Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military adviser to the supreme leader and the first commander of the Tharallah Headquarters, has stated: “The security of Tehran is, in fact, the security of Iran.”
It was this logic that led the IRGC to create Tharallah’s fortified and far-reaching apparatus in the capital. And the sheer scale of this machinery reveals the barrier the Iranian people face to achieving freedom in Iran.
The Tharallah Headquarters oversees three provincial guards for Tehran and Alborz Province. These include the IRGC Mohammad Rasulullah Corps in Tehran City, the IRGC Seyyed Ol Shuhada Corps in other cities within Tehran Province, and the IRGC Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps in Alborz province.
Among these, the IRGC’s Mohammad Rasulullah Corps in Tehran is the most important and Tehran’s main IRGC force. Established in 2007, it is responsible for maintaining the political order in Tehran city. It operates a main staff base, located on Niayesh Highway in the north of Tehran. In the vertical structure of the IRGC’s suppressive apparatus, beneath the Mohammad Rasulullah Corps lie 23 IRGC-Basij Regional Bases, each located in one of Tehran’s 22 municipality regions. These regional bases are the operational command-and-control centres during times of mass unrest in Iran. Not only do they operate as weapons warehouses, but all IRGC and Basij units gather in their respective IRGC-Basij Regional Base prior to being deployed on Tehran’s streets to crush anti-regime protests.
But the suppressive infrastructure doesn’t stop there. Beneath the 23 IRGC-Basij Regional Bases, there are 300 Basij militia District Bases, which are spread across Tehran city’s 123 municipality districts.
The final layer in the vertical structure of this extensive machinery is the Basij’s Neighbourhood Bases. A whopping total of 3,000 of such bases exist across 375 neighbourhoods in Tehran. The IRGC has duplicated this apparatus across each of Iran’s 31 provinces. This is the infrastructure designed to block regime change in Iran.
The US and Israel have started to target elements of this infrastructure – including the Tharallah Headquarters. Aware that their headquarters and bases are no longer safe, the suppressive units have been deployed onto the streets, as sources inside Iran have confirmed to me. In total, there are approximately 200,000 highly radicalised and armed members that make up this core suppressive machinery, with at least 50,000 in Tehran alone. In other words, as it currently stands, the broader extensive apparatus and its manpower still remain intact.
There is good reason for this, of course. As part of the first phase of this conflict, the US and Israeli military operation has focused on neutralising the regime’s ability to retaliate, with the main focus being on the IRGC’s ballistic missiles, launchers, air defences and offensive military hardware.
But President Trump has been very clear: the US seeks to provide the space for the Iranian people to “seize control” and reclaim their country. In order for this to happen, every aspect of this extensive suppressive architecture must be dismantled. It is for this reason why regime change in Iran requires a comprehensive military operation. It will take time and is unlikely to be a short campaign of days.
So herein lies the key questions: is it worth it? And here’s my one-word answer without any hesitation: absolutely.
The collapse of the Islamic regime in Iran is firmly in Britain’s security interests – and that of the West’s more broadly.
Let me spell this out clearly – and explain why this is not a problem confirmed to the Middle East. For 47 years, the official slogan of this regime has been “Death to England”. These aren’t empty slogans. The regime has been – and is currently – plotting terror on British streets. More than 20 terror plots linked to the Islamic regime have been foiled since 2022 alone. It has also created an extensive infrastructure across the UK to nurture homegrown Islamist radicalisation and antisemitism. The regime is targeting our politicians, our infrastructure and seeking to foment discord across our communities. It is the largest state-sponsor of terrorism; the largest state-sponsor of Islamist extremism; and the largest state-sponsor of antisemitism.
The collapse of the Islamic regime in Iran would not only liberate the Iranian people, but it would also land a devastating knockout blow to Islamist extremism across the world. What happens in Iran, doesn’t stay in Iran. It affects our lives, our safety, our interests. The Iranian people are on the front line in fighting the very Islamist extremists who are plotting terror on our streets. It is in Britain’s interests to do whatever it takes to support them.
Kasra Aarabi is the director for IRGC research at United Against Nuclear Iran and a British-Iranian expert on Iran’s military-security apparatus
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