America may have just voted itself into a political crisis far greater than it realises.
Donald Trump’s Republicans have suffered a major defeat in the US midterm elections. Democrats have seized both houses of Congress, Republican strongholds have fallen, and the president now faces two years of political obstruction.
For most commentators, rightly or wrongly, this is a referendum on Trump, the cost of living and the war with Iran. But for those of us who have lived with the consequences of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the results raise a far more disturbing question. Is the West sleepwalking into a chapter of history that Iranians have spent nearly half a century desperately trying to escape?
I was born in Iran shortly after the 1979 revolution. My family fled when I was a young child. Nearly five decades later, I find myself watching Western politics with an increasingly familiar sense of alarm. Because we have seen this political playbook before. And we know how devastating the consequences can be.
In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution was supported by a mish-mash coalition of Islamists, communists, socialists and liberal intellectuals and I use the term “intellectual” rather loosely. The left helped legitimise a religious fanatic whose ideology was fundamentally incompatible with the freedoms it claimed to champion. Their common enemy was the Shah and that was apparently enough.
What followed was the establishment of one of the world’s most oppressive theocratic regimes. Political opponents were imprisoned, women’s freedoms dismantled and thousands executed, including members of the very left-wing movements that had helped Khomeini seize power.
I have little sympathy for the political movements that helped create the monster that eventually consumed them. Their failure was not simply naivety but a catastrophic abdication of political judgement. They helped enable a religious authoritarianism whose consequences continue to devastate Iran today. And the Western left appears determined to ignore the lesson.
The Islamic Republic was not the birthplace of political Islam but its establishment in 1979 was a defining moment in the modern history of militant Islamism. A revolutionary Islamist movement had captured a major modern state and turned its ideology into an instrument of government, repression and international influence. And what began in Tehran did not stay in Tehran.
Over the following decades, the Islamic Republic exported its revolutionary ideology, supported militant organisations and cultivated networks of influence far beyond its borders. Other Islamist movements developed through their own histories and traditions, but the Islamic Republic demonstrated something profoundly consequential: religious extremism could be transformed into enduring state power.
Almost half a century later, as political Islam continues to challenge liberal and secular values in parts of the world, Iran itself may be approaching a historic reversal. The very country that helped give modern militant Islamism such international prominence could become the place where its retreat begins.
And yet, just as Iranians are seeking to break free from religious authoritarianism, the Western left appears increasingly unwilling to recognise the ideological dangers that helped imprison them in the first place.
Consider Zohran Mamdani, the democratic socialist mayor of New York, whose political ascent has been celebrated as a triumph for the American left. His initial reluctance to condemn the slogan "globalise the intifada”, despite the fear it inspired among Jewish Americans, raised deeply uncomfortable questions about the rhetoric he was prepared to tolerate.
Or Abdul El-Sayed, Michigan’s newly elected Democratic senator, whose campaign embraced the considerable online following of Hasan Piker, a commentator criticised for inflammatory remarks about Hamas, Israel and the September 11 attacks.
Mamdani subsequently said he would discourage the slogan’s use, while El-Sayed rejected Piker’s most notorious remarks. Nevertheless, their political choices deserve scrutiny rather than the reflexive celebration they have attracted in progressive circles.
The issue is not their Muslim faith, each to their own. It is their politics, their judgement and the alliances they are prepared to make. My concern is the increasingly comfortable relationship between elements of the Western left and movements whose attitudes towards religious authority, individual liberty and political violence should be utterly incompatible with progressive values.
And make no mistake: I hold the left responsible for this failure. We see echoes of the same problem in Britain, where the Green Party has become embroiled in disputes over antizionism and the political direction of progressive activism.
It should not be controversial to insist that religious authoritarianism is incompatible with liberal democracy. Yet too often, those who raise questions about extremist ideology find themselves accused of intolerance, while genuinely intolerant ideas escape sufficient scrutiny.
This is how democratic societies weaken themselves. Not necessarily through a sudden revolution, but through the gradual erosion of the political and moral boundaries designed to protect their freedoms. Political movements build momentum toward an electoral victory that confers legitimacy, which in turn attracts money, supporters and institutional access. And institutions provide the kind of influence that creates the conditions for the next victory.
Those who underestimate the significance of each successive advance may discover, too late, that the political landscape has fundamentally changed.
Iran felt that mistake in 1979. The West cannot afford to make its own version of it.
The Republican defeat should therefore be more than a moment of political embarrassment. Democrats have won extraordinary victories in states including Texas, Kansas and South Carolina. Regardless of the economic grievances that drove many voters, Republicans now face the consequences of losing political authority at a time of profound international instability.
Which brings me to Donald Trump, who has done more to confront the Islamic Republic than any American president since its establishment 47 years ago.
Where successive administrations pursued engagement, containment and compromise, Trump understood something fundamental: the Islamic Republic is not simply a difficult negotiating partner. It is a revolutionary theocracy whose repression at home and regional ambitions are central to its survival.
His withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, maximum-pressure sanctions and the killing of Qasem Soleimani marked a decisive break with previous approaches. The American military campaign against Iran in 2026 went further still. For many Iranians desperate for freedom, Trump’s willingness to confront Tehran has provided something that decades of Western diplomacy conspicuously failed to deliver: the possibility that the Islamic Republic’s grip on power might finally be broken.
But possibility is not victory. The regime remains and a wounded regime, allowed to recover, could become an even greater threat. Trump’s midterm defeat has now made the situation considerably more complicated. From January, a Democratic Congress will be able to obstruct his legislative agenda, scrutinise his foreign policy and challenge the funding of further military operations.
He may face growing pressure to abandon the confrontation with Tehran, particularly given the war’s contribution to Republican electoral losses. But this is precisely the moment when strategic resolve matters most.
The question should not simply be whether America can afford to continue confronting the Islamic Republic. It should be whether America and the wider world can afford the consequences of allowing it to survive.
A regime that has spent nearly five decades exporting instability, sponsoring militant organisations and violently suppressing its population will not suddenly become benign because Washington decides the political cost of confronting it is too high.
Trump now faces a defining choice. He could use the remaining weeks before January to pursue a decisive strategy for ending the Islamic Republic’s rule. Or he could continue exercising the foreign-policy and executive powers available to him after the new Congress takes office, within the constitutional limits governing military action.
Neither option is simple. Regime change is not achieved merely by removing a government, and any credible strategy must address the political transition, the security of the Iranian population and the dangers of regional instability. But the objective should be clear: the end of the Islamic Republic and the opportunity for Iranians to establish a secular, democratic state.
There is an incredible historical irony unfolding, one that I fear much of the Western world has yet to grasp. Nearly five decades ago, Iran became the epicentre of a revolutionary “experiment” in political and fanatical Islam whose influence would reach far beyond its borders. Today, the Iranian people are fighting to bring that experiment to an end. They want a country where religion is a personal choice, not an instrument of government, where women enjoy equal rights and where political power comes from the people rather than the clergy.
For many, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has emerged as a symbol of that ambition, advocating a secular, democratic transition in which Iranians themselves determine their country’s future.
And herein lies the possibility of something far greater than regime change in a single country. What if the ideological cycle that gained such momentum in Tehran in 1979 begins to reverse in Tehran itself?
The removal of the Islamic Republic would not immediately dismantle the networks and movements it has spent decades supporting. Nor would it bring an overnight end to militant Islamism, whose roots and influence extend far beyond Iran. That process could take decades, perhaps generations.
But the fall of one of the world’s most influential sponsors of revolutionary Islamism would be an extraordinary turning point. It could begin the gradual erosion of an ideological project that has inflicted immense suffering on Iranians and contributed to instability far beyond their borders.
For the Iranian people, it would represent the opportunity to reclaim their country and finally separate religion from political power. For the West, it should be a moment of profound reflection.
Because while Iran could be approaching the beginning of its liberation from religious authoritarianism, parts of the Western political establishment appear increasingly willing to overlook the dangers of its ideological cousins. That is the paradox at the heart of these American midterm elections.
Trump, arguably the American president who has done most to confront the Islamic Republic, has been weakened at precisely the moment when a historic opportunity may be within reach.
Whether he can finish what he started remains uncertain. But what happens next in Iran could have consequences that extend far beyond his presidency.
America’s political establishment should understand that the challenge is not simply what becomes of Trump, or even what becomes of Iran. It is what kind of world emerges in the decades that follow.
The Islamic Republic’s establishment in 1979 helped change the trajectory of political Islam. Its demise could help change that trajectory again.
Iran may soon begin a journey towards secular freedom that takes generations to complete. Meanwhile, Western democracies may spend those same decades confronting the consequences of today’s ideological complacency.
The great tragedy would be for Iranians to finally escape the mistakes of 1979, only to watch the West repeat them. By the time the West recognises what is happening, it may already have surrendered far more than it realises.
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