There is still a great deal we do not know about the memorandum of understanding that has now reportedly been signed digitally between the United States and Iran.
The unanswered questions are not minor details. They go to the heart of whether this agreement can genuinely prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state, which should remain the primary priority after everything this region has been through over the last three years.
What verification mechanisms will be put in place to monitor and restrict Iran's ability to pursue a nuclear capability? What will happen to the roughly 450 kilograms of highly enriched uranium that remains buried beneath Isfahan? Will it be removed or destroyed? Who will remove it, and who will be responsible for safeguarding it? Will Iran retain the right to enrich uranium in the future, even at low levels?
As of now, it appears that the agreement does not address Iran's ballistic missile programme, a natural concern for Israel. There is the equally troubling issue that the flow of money into Iran could once again find its way into the hands of Hezbollah and Hamas as well as other terrorist proxies. And there is no escaping the possibility that Tehran will eventually seek to rebuild the military capabilities that were degraded during the recent war.
But while these concerns are real, they need to be looked at with the right context and nuance.
That this deal is flawed, is no longer a question. That the victory Prime Minister Netanyahu promised Israel has not been achieved is also not a secret. But, that does not automatically mean Israel is worse off than it was before. No matter how one looks at the current reality, it is impossible to ignore that Israel – from a security perspective - is in a safer position today than it was before February 28, when the war with Iran began.
The same, broadly speaking, can be said about the last three years since October 7.
The Hamas massacre shattered Israel's sense of security and plunged the country into a war that, until this week, seemed as though it might never end. And yet, despite everything, not all is bleak.
Hamas might still control large parts of Gaza and have fighters, weapons, and the ability to attack but it is a shadow of its former self. Hezbollah remains deeply embedded within Lebanon and retains capabilities that continue to threaten Israel but it is far from being the fighting force that it was when it began firing into Israel on October 8, 2023.
They have been weakened, exposed and are today more vulnerable than anyone could have imagined back on the eve of this long war. That reality creates opportunity and whether those opportunities are seized depends on the political leaders in Jerusalem and Washington and whether they can show a similar measure of courage like the soldiers who fought in these wars.
We mustn’t forget that Iran is a country under unprecedented strain. It faces runaway inflation, a currency that has collapsed in value, widespread unemployment, damaged infrastructure that will require hundreds of billions of dollars to rebuild, and a military that has been severely degraded.
Perhaps most remarkably, Iran has not enriched uranium for an entire year – since the 12-day war in June 2025 until now. That is the longest period in two decades that the Islamic Republic has gone without advancing its enrichment programme.
That is not a small thing and while it does not mean Iran cannot rebuild centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow, it does not mean that time has been created, and in the Middle East, time itself can be a strategic asset.
This does not mean that Israel can simply rest. Unfortunately, in such a volatile region and with enemies still nearby, the country will have no choice but draw several immediate lessons.
First, intelligence will matter now more than ever. The Iranians will become more sophisticated and more cautious in hunting spies and concealing illicit activity. Israel will need to invest heavily in intelligence collection and maintain the ability to detect, in real time, any move toward a nuclear breakout.
Second, we need to finally understand that military power cannot exist in a vacuum and needs a parallel political process. Lebanon offers an imperfect but important example – even while striking Hezbollah, Israel engaged in negotiations with the Lebanese government. It understood that military action and political processes cannot be mutually exclusive. The same thinking will be required in Gaza and, ideally, in shaping the broader framework through which Iran is contained.
Finally, Israel must preserve what has always been its ultimate insurance policy.
Long before October 7, before the recent wars and missile barrages reshaped the Middle East, the IDF prepared for the possibility that one day it would need to act alone against Iran. It prepared plans like those that were used against Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 and Syria's nuclear facility in 2007, understanding that there may come a moment when there are no alternatives.
If that day returns, Israel will once again have to do what it has always reserved the right to do: defend itself, by itself.
Perhaps that is the central lesson of this moment.
The deal that is coming is not peace. And a signature on a digital MOU will not change the evil character of the Iranian regime. Israel might not be able to control every decision made in the White House but it can control is its own preparedness, its own resilience, and its willingness to act when necessary.
That has always been the Israel story: recognise danger beforehand, seize realistic opportunities and understand that security is never guaranteed.
Yaakov Katz is a co-founder of the MEAD Forum, a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute, and former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post. His latest book (with Amir Bohbot), While Israel Slept, is a bestseller in the United States
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