Over the past two days, the ceasefire between the US and the Islamic Republic of Iran, reached last month, has effectively collapsed. After the regime attacked commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the US has now struck regime targets for a second straight day, with Tehran responding by attacking neighbouring countries. The question is why the Islamic Republic would risk its remaining military assets and oil exports by provoking Washington.
By midday on July 9, Tehran time, the Iranian armed forces had announced a new wave of attacks against US bases across the region, virtually guaranteeing further American retaliation. Iranian commanders had earlier vowed to target all countries hosting US forces.
At the same time, President Donald Trump's rhetoric toward Tehran's decision-makers has undergone a dramatic reversal over the past 48 hours. Abandoning his previously conciliatory tone, he denounced them as "liars." Nour News, an outlet closely aligned with Iran's top security establishment, responded on July 9: "Trump speaks of attack and blockade; but in the Persian Gulf, a crisis may begin with a single decision, while no will can guarantee how it ends. Some responses come late, but they change the equation."
Although last month's temporary agreement established a fragile ceasefire, it left the final status of the Strait unresolved and required Tehran to refrain from interfering with maritime traffic during the 60-day pause in hostilities. As shipping gradually resumed, largely by routing vessels along Oman's southern coast, Tehran appears to have concluded that its most valuable bargaining chip was losing leverage.
For Trump, whose primary objective in agreeing to the ceasefire was the reopening of Hormuz and the restoration of global energy flows, Iran’s renewed attacks crossed a red line. Iranian leaders may have misjudged his tolerance, having repeatedly argued that Washington has little ability to neutralise Tehran's leverage over the strategic waterway.
Some analysts argue that the Islamic Republic is acting rationally by intimidating commercial shipping in order to preserve its strongest negotiating asset. But viewed in the broader context of the diplomatic crises that have unfolded since Trump withdrew from the Obama-era nuclear agreement in 2018, Tehran's persistent reluctance to reach a lasting accommodation with Washington becomes evident, including during the Biden presidency.
Others contend that escalation is intrinsic to the Islamic Republic's political model. Even after losing dozens of senior leaders in 2025 and 2026, suffering extensive damage to its military infrastructure, and coming under a naval blockade, the leadership still appears convinced that controlled military escalation can produce strategic gains.
Yet the internal crisis may be even more serious than the military and economic challenges. With Ali Khamenei gone, the central pillar holding together the Islamic Republic's political system has disappeared. His designated successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, is either dead or incapacitated. Power appears to rest with an opaque inner circle whose most visible public figure is Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. His institutional authority, however, rests largely on an office whose term expires within a year. Reproducing the tightly choreographed electoral process that characterised the Khamenei era may prove increasingly difficult as competing factions seek a larger share of power in the absence of an undisputed arbiter.
One indication of these tensions was the absence of Iran's three former presidents from Khamenei's lengthy funeral ceremonies in early July. Either the ruling leadership excluded them, or they chose to boycott the ceremonies in silent protest.
Instead of pursuing stabilisation, economic recovery, and reconciliation with its neighbours, the Islamic Republic continues to bet on escalation, hoping that military pressure will force Washington to back down and ultimately strengthen Tehran's regional position.
Perhaps that confidence reflects another strategic miscalculation. As one Iranian journalist wrote, "The history of the Islamic Republic is less a history of victories than a history of strategic miscalculations – from the seizure of the US Embassy and the nuclear programme to its proxy strategy, and now its gamble with the Strait of Hormuz.”
The Islamic Republic seems to believe it is raising the cost for the US and strengthening its hand; in reality, it is weakening a regime already under unprecedented strain.
Mardo Soghom is a former deputy editor and regional director for West Asia at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
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