It wasn’t just Netanyahu who rejected Trump’s Gaza plan – most of Israel did too

And then there were the election polls. Netanyahu continues to struggle as his rivals challenge his claim that only he can be trusted to manage Israel’s security. By the time the cabinet reconvened this Sunday, the prime minister had done a 180. The plan he had persuaded his ministers to approve just a few weeks earlier was no longer one he was prepared to support.

On one level, the announcement this week is risky and can lead to another front with the Trump administration at a time when relations between Jerusalem and Washington are already strained. The war with Iran continues without a clear end in sight, disagreements have emerged over strategy, and Trump has increasingly demonstrated that he is willing to pursue his own policies even when Israel objects.

Defying the president over Gaza would therefore be a significant gamble for any Israeli prime minister, but particularly for Netanyahu. For years, one of his central political arguments has been that his personal relationship with Trump gives him the ability to derive strategic benefits from the president. Picking a fight now with Trump over one of his signature Middle East initiatives risks undermining that argument.

But on another level, Netanyahu’s reversal should not come as a complete surprise.

When the announcement came that Hamas had agreed to disarm, much of the world greeted the news with celebration. In Israel, the reaction was closer to a shrug.

That was not because Israelis oppose ending the war or because they do not want a different future for Gaza. It is because very few Israelis genuinely believe that Hamas, after everything that has happened, will simply surrender its weapons because it signed an agreement.

Even among Israelis on the centre and left, there is little confidence that Hamas has suddenly abandoned the ideology that led to the massacre on October 7 or that an organisation that has spent decades building tunnels, rockets and terrorist infrastructure will simply decide to dismantle itself because of diplomatic pressure.

That is why Israel’s demand – that Hamas first demonstrate that it is actually disarming before Israel undertakes significant withdrawals – should not automatically be viewed through the usual prism of right versus left.

This matters, because there is a tendency, particularly outside Israel, to assume that Netanyahu’s policies toward Gaza are fundamentally ideological and that a change of prime minister would automatically bring a dramatic change in Israeli policy.

That is hardly the truth. The differences between Netanyahu and his two leading contenders in the upcoming election – Gadi Eisenkot and Naftali Bennett – on the core security questions surrounding Gaza are far smaller than many people imagine.

Bennett has long been an outspoken opponent of the establishment of a Palestinian state. Eisenkot has also made clear that he does not believe such a state is realistic in the foreseeable future. Both have taken hawkish positions when it comes to Israel’s security requirements in Gaza – Bennett during his time as defense minister and prime minister, and Eisenkot during his tenure as IDF chief of staff and later as a member of the wartime government.

If either man becomes prime minister after the election, the tone and rhetoric would most certainly change and the relationship with Washington and even Europe will also initially feel different.

But on the fundamental question – can Israel base its security on an assumption that Hamas will voluntarily transform itself – the answer will probably remain the same.

And this is one of the most important lessons Israel has taken from October 7.

For years before the attack, Israeli policy was built around assumptions – that Hamas had become pragmatic, that its responsibilities as the governing authority in Gaza meant that it wanted quiet. Then came October 7.

That does not mean Israel can never reach agreements with its enemies. Political deals need to be part of any resolution to end the war. What it does mean though is that agreements involving Israeli security need to be structured differently than they were in the past. They have to be incremental, verified and tested over time.

Interestingly, there are people inside the Board of Peace who appear to understand that as well. While some members pushed for the comprehensive agreement that was eventually announced, others favoured a more gradual model similar to what is currently being tested in southern Lebanon.

Under that approach, Israel does not withdraw from large areas based solely on promises. Instead, the IDF vacates a limited area, allows the Lebanese Armed Forces to deploy and then waits to see if the LAF can actually prevent Hezbollah from returning.

If the answer is yes, the model can then be expanded to another area. If the answer is no, Israel stops.

The same logic could potentially apply in Gaza. Hamas would first have to demonstrate that disarmament is real. An alternative governing and security mechanism would have to prove that it can operate effectively. Israel would withdraw gradually, based not on declarations but on performance.

That is a slower process and certainly a less dramatic one. But after October 7, Israel is likely to care far more about whether an agreement works than about how impressive it looks when it is announced.

There is, however, one important distinction between Netanyahu and those who are working to replace him. Netanyahu has spent decades dealing with American presidents, some of whom he has clashed with like Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. He has repeatedly demonstrated that he is willing to say no to Washington when he believes an Israeli interest is at stake and, just as importantly, that he knows how to absorb the political fallout that follows.

That does not mean that every disagreement benefited Israel. But the experience is there, something that Bennett and Eisenkot do not yet have.

If one of them becomes prime minister, he would enter office facing an American administration that is deeply invested in its Gaza plan and a president who does not respond kindly when publicly challenged. A new Israeli prime minister, eager to establish a strong relationship with Washington, might find it more difficult to reject an American demand or slow down a process Trump wants accelerated.

That is why the real debate after the election should not simply be about personalities or whether Israel’s next prime minister will be more popular in Washington.

It should be about judgment.

Can the next government distinguish between an opportunity and a gamble? Can it work closely with an American president without outsourcing Israeli security decisions to Washington? Can it pursue diplomacy without once again convincing itself that its enemies have become something they are not?

Those questions will matter far more than whether the next prime minister is Benjamin Netanyahu, Gadi Eisenkot or Naftali Bennett.

October 7 showed Israel what can happen when hope becomes an assumption and an assumption becomes policy. Whatever government emerges from this election, that is one lesson it cannot afford to forget.