For nearly half a century, the Islamic Republic has been preparing a war to destroy the State of Israel. The regime in Iran has invested hundreds of billions of dollars, primarily in three major efforts to realise that ambition: the nuclear programme, the ballistic missile programme, and the construction of a “ring of fire” encircling Israel. The present war is intended to eliminate all of these threats, in the hope that the regime will be so weakened that the Iranian people will take to the streets and succeed in toppling the oppressive and corrupt government.
In June 2025, a swift and successful operation against Iran enabled Israel, with precise but narrowly focused American assistance, to halt the nuclear programme and delay missile production. Even earlier, following Hamas’s October 7 attack, Israel fought a prolonged war on two fronts, during which it dealt a severe blow to Hezbollah and neutralised Hamas as a force capable of threatening Israel. As a result of Israel’s success against Hezbollah, Sunni rebels were able to capture Damascus, thereby completely shattering Iran’s “ring of fire”.
It became clear, however, that despite the IDF’s achievements, the tasks remained unfinished in every theatre.
In the Gaza Strip, the American President announced a 20-point plan, centred on the voluntary disarmament of Hamas. Israel is acting in accordance with those 20 points and facilitating the plan’s progress. The United States will now have to demonstrate that its part of the arrangement – the full disarmament of Hamas – is indeed implemented. Those involved understand that if the US-established mechanism fails to disarm the terrorist organisation, the IDF will do so by force. This would not be a short war. Yet by its conclusion, which would take roughly a year, Hamas would no longer be able to rule over Gaza’s residents, would cease to be a military power and a significant portion of its remaining personnel would be eliminated.
In Lebanon, following a ceasefire initiated by the United States, the Lebanese government was expected to disarm Hezbollah. The process began sluggishly in southern Lebanon, but almost nothing was done in central and northern areas. The IDF acted in line with what had been agreed with Washington as part of the ceasefire, countering Hezbollah’s attempts to rebuild its capabilities.
Nevertheless, the damage inflicted on the organisation was only partial. Hezbollah’s decision this week to join the assault against Israel on the second day of the war demonstrates how limited the achievements of the Lebanese Army have been, despite its declaration that disarmament had begun. Hezbollah’s opening of hostilities is likely to bring a dramatic shift: the IDF is prepared to deliver a severe blow, potentially including a full-scale ground operation. The objective is to dismantle Hezbollah as a military organisation, thereby enabling the Lebanese government to complete its disarmament.
With regard to Iran, a more complex reality emerged. Despite Israel’s successes in June 2025, the regime swiftly resumed ballistic missile production, with substantial assistance from China, and made efforts to restore the nuclear programme. As a result, Israel concluded that another campaign against Iran would be unavoidable. Lessons from the June operation were thoroughly analysed in order to determine what should be done, where resources should be invested, and where genuine improvement was required.
No one planned it in advance, but the situation created by protests erupting across Iran triggered by severe economic hardship and acute water shortages – to the extent that there was even talk of evacuating parts of Tehran’s civilian population – presented a new opportunity. Moreover, the US President’s call on Iranian demonstrators to take to the streets because “help is on the way” created a US commitment to act against Iran.
The US, genuinely seeking a comprehensive agreement that would dismantle the nuclear project without the use of force, entered negotiations and allowed the Iranians room to compromise. They did not. Their evasive responses designed to buy time and their calculated formulations – intended to avoid blame for the crisis – led Washington to conclude that there was no partner for dialogue and that force was necessary. Israel’s Prime Minister persuaded the President that the missile programme was also a grave threat to the wider world. Thus, eliminating the nuclear programme and destroying the missile production infrastructure became the two central objectives of the present war.
To prepare for the possible use of force, the US assembled a vast and sophisticated air armada across the region – in neighbouring states, the Mediterranean, and the Gulf. This served as leverage in negotiations: a demonstration of the alternative should no agreement be reached. At the same time, it constituted the very force that would be deployed in the absence of a deal. The military capabilities the US gathered led to a new strategic assessment. As a result – and in light of the regime’s brutal suppression of protests – an additional mission was added: creating the conditions for the Iranian people to overthrow the regime.
Israel recognised this as a historic opportunity unlikely to return, given both the regime’s fragility and the current American President’s willingness to embark on a major and potentially prolonged war, despite uncertainties surrounding the mission of “creating the conditions for revolution”. The uncertainty does not stem from any doubt about the legitimacy of the objective – quite the contrary. Rather, it arises from the fact that, however justified, it remains unclear whether such an outcome can be achieved through air power alone, however extensive. Close cooperation between the US and Israel increases the likelihood of success, as their combined air force capabilities are formidable.
The war is being fought in exceptionally close cooperation between the IDF and CENTCOM, the US command responsible for the region. Following the President’s decision that this was the correct course of action, the two militaries achieved unprecedented coordination, creating a formidable war machine composed of two very different armed forces. Each side contributes its comparative advantage; each relies fully on the other. For the first time in Israel’s history, a genuine military coalition has emerged. The personal closeness and mutual respect between the US President and Israel’s Prime Minister have undoubtedly strengthened the alliance, but at its core lie shared strategic outlooks and closely aligned interests.
Many demand to know what will happen “the day after”. The leaders focus instead on the military campaign ahead, aware that the degree of military success will profoundly shape post-war realities. They are correct to emphasise the next stages of the war rather than speculate about the world that will follow. Outcomes will determine the options.
One example of how the war will shape the future more than any prior planning is the potential transformation in the Gulf as a result of Iran’s decision to attack its neighbours. Different reactions could lead to markedly different scenarios during and after the war, and there was no practical way to factor such developments into advance planning.
Now that Iran has widened the theatre to include all Gulf states, the US–Israeli alliance will need to respond and leverage the situation to advance its three objectives. That could not have been pre-designed. Flexibility is essential, along with timely responses to new developments, while resolutely pursuing the operational plan formulated by Washington and Jerusalem before the campaign began. In that resolve and determination lies the capacity to succeed — and ultimately to shape a less violent Middle East that promotes prosperity and better lives for all. That is the “day after” worth striving for.
Maj. Gen. Yaakov Amidror (Ret.), who served in the IDF for 36 years, is a former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister and Head of the National Security Council. He is currently a fellow at JINSA in Washington DC and at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security
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