Hezbollah is only one rocket salvo away from the elimination of its last few senior commanders

Hezbollah's defeat by Israel and the continuous elimination of top leadership have since catapulted Tabataba'i to the helm of the terror organisation's military wing. He collaborated closely with Mohammed Haidar, a senior adviser on the "Jihad Council" who himself survived an assassination attempt. Over the past year, both men, like the few other surviving senior Hezbollah officials, have been focused predominantly on attempts to reconstruct terror infrastructure within Lebanon, not on engagement in Sanaa or Damascus. Consequently, the Iranian axis has suffered severe setbacks, or even outright collapse, on both of those distant fronts.

Tabataba'i's death will exacerbate Hezbollah's debate over how to respond to Israel's strikes in Lebanon—a conversation the deceased official himself was engaged in. Recently, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem ramped up his rhetoric, declaring that "the current situation cannot continue." Qassem seems to have channelled the discontent brewing within the organisation's ranks following the hundreds of targeted killings in the past year.

Yesterday, two senior Hezbollah figures addressed the attack. While Member of Parliament Ali Ammar spoke about finding "the appropriate time" for a response, Mohammed Qamati stressed that "all options are open." These remarks are highly indicative of the profound disagreement within Hezbollah that will dominate the leadership's upcoming consultations.

On one side, Hezbollah finds itself in a position of historic weakness and is disadvantaged against Israel, despite its efforts to recover. Launching a single rocket or a full salvo could provide Israel with the perfect pretext for additional strikes, eliminating the few remaining senior commanders. Qassem may lack strength and charisma, but the organisation has no superior alternative. The head of Hezbollah's political council, Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed, is an equally uninspiring figure. On the other side, the organisation faces growing turmoil among the Shi'ite public in Lebanon due to delays in reconstruction and compensation payments, fuelling a strong desire for revenge.

Despite these immediate pressures, Hezbollah's calculus is rooted in the long term. Their reasoning dictates that as long as the Shi'ite Muslim population continues to expand at the expense of Christians and maintains its support for the terror group, they can afford to wait and concentrate solely on infrastructure repair. With the passage of time, Lebanon will become progressively more Shi'ite and pro-Iranian, they believe. Under this view, the current Lebanese government, including figures like President Michel Aoun, represent the final stand of the country's "pro-Western" elements.

This dynamic shifts the central dilemma to Israel. Can Jerusalem accept a diminished Hezbollah, fully aware that it might fully rebound in 10 years, or should it exploit the current opportunity to push the terror group into an even deeper abyss — a crisis point where its rivals within the Land of the Cedars will finally have the courage to step in and permanently dismantle the organisation's arsenal?

Originally published by Israel Hayom