Why Jerusalem is increasingly wary of Erdoğan’s Turkey

At Eid al-Fitr prayers in Istanbul in March 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan prayed: "May Allah... destroy and devastate Zionist Israel." Earlier this month, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan used conspiratorial language when he described Israel as "a burden that humanity can no longer bear."

These are not the words of leaders expressing policy differences with another state. They are attempts to delegitimise Israel's very existence and portray the Jewish state as something whose disappearance would benefit humanity.

That matters because Turkey is not simply another critic of Israel.

It is NATO's second-largest military power, occupies one of the world's most strategically important geographical positions and continues to enjoy considerable influence in Washington.

Despite tensions with successive US administrations over Ankara's purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system, the recent meeting between Erdoğan and President Donald Trump suggest relations are improving once again. Turkey hopes eventually to return to the F-35 fighter programme and restore defence cooperation with the United States.

This is considered such a concern for the Israeli government it prompted Prime Minister Netanyahu to do multiple interviews with American media using arguably the bluntest public criticism of a Trump Administration policy.

Israel therefore faces a challenge unlike any other in the region: an increasingly hostile government leading a major NATO member with growing regional ambitions.

As with many events connected to Israel, it has less to do with the Jewish State and more to do with the country’s internal issues and geopolitical posturing.

Much of Erdoğan's foreign policy is driven by what scholars commonly describe as neo-Ottomanism. Although Erdoğan rarely uses the term, it has become the accepted description of his ambition to restore Turkey's political, economic, cultural and strategic influence across territories once governed by the Ottoman Empire.

The intellectual architect of this vision was Ahmet Davutoğlu, Erdoğan's long-serving adviser, foreign minister and later prime minister. In his influential book Strategic Depth, published in 2001, Davutoğlu argued that Turkey's geography and Ottoman heritage destined it to become the central power spanning the Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and beyond.

This is not necessarily a blueprint for territorial conquest. Rather, it is a vision of regional leadership achieved through diplomacy, military power, economic influence, religion and cultural outreach.

Running alongside this vision has been Erdoğan's long-standing sympathy for movements associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Neo-Ottomanism and the Brotherhood are not identical ideologies. One is centred on Turkish geopolitical influence, the other on transnational political Islam. Yet under Erdoğan they have often converged, particularly during the Arab Spring, when Ankara openly supported Brotherhood-aligned governments and movements across the region.

Hamas, itself an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, has benefited from this relationship. Erdoğan has repeatedly defended Hamas, refused to classify it as a terrorist organisation and allowed senior Hamas figures to operate from Turkey.

Since October 7, Israeli officials have become increasingly concerned that Turkey has become an important hub for Hamas's political and logistical activities, and reports have suggested it would become their new base of operations.

Within both neo-Ottoman and Brotherhood thinking, Israel occupies a unique place.

It is the region's only non-Muslim state, a close Western ally and a symbol around which aspiring leaders of the Sunni Muslim world can rally public opinion. Opposition to Israel provides inexpensive political capital domestically while reinforcing claims to regional leadership internationally.

For Erdoğan, it also serves another purpose. Turkey faces serious economic difficulties, persistent inflation, growing political polarisation and increasing criticism over democratic backsliding. Opposition politicians have been imprisoned, journalists prosecuted, elections challenged and institutions that once acted as checks on executive power have steadily weakened. The military and judiciary, long viewed as guardians of Turkey's secular order and democracy, have been fundamentally reshaped over the past decade.

Against this backdrop, confrontation with Israel offers a convenient external focus. Nevertheless, Israel should not dismiss the rhetoric as merely political theatre.

Historically, even during diplomatic crises, practical cooperation often continued. Trade expanded, intelligence sharing survived, and security coordination remained largely intact despite public disagreements.

The current situation is fundamentally different. The language emanating from Ankara increasingly resembles that heard in Tehran. The difference is that Turkey possesses a far larger economy,  NATO's second-largest armed forces, sophisticated indigenous defence industries, expanding influence across Africa and the Middle East, and a strategic position controlling access between Europe, Asia and the Black Sea.

Jerusalem is also watching Turkey's growing footprint beyond its borders. Turkish forces remain active in northern Syria and Iraq. Ankara has established military bases stretching from Qatar to Somalia and has become an increasingly influential player in Libya, the Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Turkey's influence in Syria has expanded significantly, giving Ankara far greater leverage immediately along Israel's northern frontier than at any point in recent decades.

None of this means conflict between Israel and Turkey is inevitable. Nor does it mean cooperation cannot eventually be rebuilt. However, it does mean Israeli policymakers have recognised that Turkey has changed.

For decades, Israel's strategic doctrine focused on Iran as the principal long-term regional challenger and still remains the foremost threat. Yet Israel can no longer afford to view Turkey solely through the lens of a difficult bilateral relationship or periodic diplomatic crises.

Under Erdoğan, Turkey increasingly sees itself as the leading power of a resurgent Islamic civilisation stretching across much of the former Ottoman world. In that vision, Israel is not merely a neighbouring state with whom Ankara disagrees. It is an obstacle to Turkey's regional ambitions and an indispensable foil in Erdoğan's domestic and international narrative.

That is why many in Jerusalem are starting to regard Turkey, the former ally, as more a foe than a mere regional rival.

Ashley Perry is a former senior Israeli government adviser who has worked with eight cabinet ministers, was a former advisor to the Negev Forum, and has been involved in Israeli politics and every election campaign for the past two decades.