The war drums are beating, and the signs are piling up that something might happen soon with Iran.
On Wednesday, CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper visited Israel for talks with IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir and Mossad Director Roman Gofman, who was recently in Washington for talks with the CIA. The meetings came as additional American naval ships reached the region, including another aircraft carrier. All of this makes clear that military options are being prepared.
Another offensive will likely go beyond the nuclear installations and ballistic missile facilities that the US and Israel struck last winter. This time, it seems the focus could also be on Iran’s energy facilities and other strategic infrastructure. The consequences could be significant, including Iranian retaliation against Gulf states and renewed ballistic missile attacks against Israel.
The first question, therefore, is why attack at all, and why now?
Israel and the United States have already fought two major rounds against Iran over the past 18 months – the 12-day war in June 2025 and the war that began in February of this year. Both campaigns inflicted significant damage on Iran’s military infrastructure and nuclear capabilities. So what has changed in the months since that makes another offensive necessary?
That Iran is trying to rebuild its ballistic missile arsenal should surprise no one. That it might also be trying to restore its nuclear programme is equally predictable. But rebuilding capabilities is not necessarily the same as presenting an imminent threat requiring immediate military intervention.
What is the intelligence actually showing?
Has Iran crossed a new nuclear threshold? Is there evidence that it has resumed uranium enrichment at a dangerous level? Has it made progress toward weaponising its nuclear programme? Is its missile production recovering faster than anticipated? Or has intelligence uncovered preparations for an attack that cannot be stopped through other means? Some reports have suggested that Iran is pursuing chemical or biological weapons, alongside ramping up production of ballistic missiles.
These are not minor details. They are the difference between an operation of necessity and one of choice.
The second question is what exactly Israel and the US hope to accomplish.
If the goal is regime change, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suggested a few weeks ago, then we need to understand what that requires. Toppling the Iranian regime is unlikely to be achieved through a bombing campaign, certainly not one lasting just a couple of weeks. It would require a prolonged campaign, potentially extending well beyond airstrikes, with no guarantee of success and no certainty about what would replace the regime.
Is the US prepared for such a commitment? Considering how quickly Americans began warning of a “forever war” during the previous campaign, and particularly after the midterms, this seems highly unlikely.
But if regime change is not the objective, what is?
Perhaps the intention is simply to destroy capabilities that Iran has rebuilt, further weaken its military infrastructure and delay its nuclear ambitions. In other words, to mow the lawn.
Israel knows this strategy well. For approximately two decades, it used this approach against Hamas in Gaza. Every few years, another military operation would destroy terrorist infrastructure, eliminate commanders, reduce weapons stockpiles and supposedly restore deterrence.
Then Hamas would rebuild, and the cycle would begin again. We all know how that ended.
Iran is not Hamas, and the strategic circumstances are different. But the underlying dilemma is similar. If another major operation is necessary less than a year after the previous one, which itself took place less than a year after the one before it, will another be required six months from now? And another six months after that?
The point of these questions is not to suggest that Israel should refrain from attacking Iran. Military force might be necessary and justified. But we need to recognise that degrading an adversary’s capabilities is not the same as eliminating the threat it poses.
Which brings us to the final and perhaps most important question: Why is the government not explaining any of this to the public?
Netanyahu does not need to reveal classified intelligence or disclose operational plans. No one expects that. But he should explain what has changed and why another offensive might now be necessary. Israelis will be expected to sit in bomb shelters and endure missile attacks. There will be damage, people could be injured, and some could even be killed. Do they not deserve to know why this might be happening once again?
This is especially true right now, when Israel faces political uncertainty as Gadi Eisenkot tries to form a coalition. There are legitimate reasons to be concerned about going to war when there is no stable government in place.
At the same time, the absence of a new government does not automatically make war illegitimate. Israel needs to protect itself – even after an election, when parties are negotiating – and Iran might be calculating that the political uncertainty makes this an opportune moment to test the West.
The fact is that both Gadi Eisenkot and Naftali Bennett met separately with Netanyahu for security briefings amid growing concerns about Iran. And despite the suspicions already circulating before the election about Netanyahu’s motivations when it comes to Iran, neither emerged from those meetings declaring that the Iranian threat was fabricated or that the prime minister was inventing a crisis.
That does not mean they necessarily agree with Netanyahu’s assessment that another military operation is urgently needed. But there is an important distinction between questioning the timing of military action and questioning whether a threat exists.
Iran is a real and dangerous threat to Israel, and Israelis across the political spectrum recognise that the clerics in Tehran have been the source of almost all of the violence and instability in the Middle East. But while Israelis understand the threat, they still deserve to know why another war might be necessary now, what it is intended to accomplish and whether the government has a strategy that extends beyond the next round of airstrikes.
Because the question is not whether Iran is a threat. It is whether another military offensive is the best way to confront that threat. And before Israel embarks on another war, its leaders have an obligation to explain why the answer is yes.
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