Good news from Iran

Of course, the Iranian censorship on information makes it difficult to know what really happened but the catastrophic failure of a number of centrifuges all at the same time looks much like the described effects of the Stuxnet virus.

http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/stuxnet-worm-targets-automate...

For the P1 centrifuge found at the Natanz enrichment plants, a frequency of 1410 Hz would translate into a tangential rotor wall speed of 443 meters per second, faster than what the aluminum P1 rotor could withstand. As a result, if the frequency of the rotor increased to 1410 Hz, the rotor would fly apart when the tangential speed of the rotor exceeded about 400 meters per second. If the rotor did not reach that speed—perhaps the computer control system responds by slowing down or shutting down the centrifuge—Stuxnet would send its next command to lower the frequency to 2 Hz. If the rotor assembly slowed down too quickly it might not survive its passage through critical frequencies. Centrifuge plants are designed to empty centrifuges quickly of uranium hexafluoride in the event of a malfunction. The reason is that if a centrifuge rotor assembly runs down with the uranium hexafluoride inside, the rotor will likely become unbalanced and “crash,” or break.

I think the extent of the damages done by the Stuxnet worm has been carefully hidden to the public. Whoever did that, thanks!

Of course, the Iranian censorship on information makes it difficult to know what really happened but the catastrophic failure of a number of centrifuges all at the same time looks much like the described effects of the Stuxnet virus.

http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/stuxnet-worm-targets-automate...

For the P1 centrifuge found at the Natanz enrichment plants, a frequency of 1410 Hz would translate into a tangential rotor wall speed of 443 meters per second, faster than what the aluminum P1 rotor could withstand. As a result, if the frequency of the rotor increased to 1410 Hz, the rotor would fly apart when the tangential speed of the rotor exceeded about 400 meters per second. If the rotor did not reach that speed—perhaps the computer control system responds by slowing down or shutting down the centrifuge—Stuxnet would send its next command to lower the frequency to 2 Hz. If the rotor assembly slowed down too quickly it might not survive its passage through critical frequencies. Centrifuge plants are designed to empty centrifuges quickly of uranium hexafluoride in the event of a malfunction. The reason is that if a centrifuge rotor assembly runs down with the uranium hexafluoride inside, the rotor will likely become unbalanced and “crash,” or break.

I think the extent of the damages done by the Stuxnet worm has been carefully hidden to the public. Whoever did that, thanks!